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Executive summary 
Age dlscrlmlnatlon against older workers in employment exists in various forms in all 
European Community (EC) countries, although it is not yet recognised as 'dlscrlmina-
tlon' by the majority of countries. 
This is the first EC study to analyse age dtscrlmlnatory measures affecting older workers' 
access to employment. It focuses on statutory national provisions, with some considera-
tion of employers' practices. 
Age discrlmlnatlon among older workers is not new, although ln the light of economic 
recessions which many EC member states have faced ln recent years, practices which 
discrlminate against older workers are more commonplace. Clearly there is a need to 
address this imbalance, and this report - as a first step - has sought to identify both 
positive and negative practices. 
The study was initiated and coordinated by Euroltnk Age as part of the European Year 
of Older People 1993. It is based on national reports from 11 EC countries and from the 
USA. 
The main findings 
• Increasing numbers of workers aged over 55, or 50, are obliged or 'persuaded' 
to leave work early- between 5 and 15 years before official retirement age  . 
• Their early exit is usually decided on grounds of age, regardless of individual 
abilities or health . 
• Once out of work, it is almost impossible to re-enter the labour market. They 
remain in enforced inactivity until pensionable age. 
• Age discrimination in recruitment policies starts from age 40 in most countries. 
• No country, except France, provides targeted assistance to help the older 
unemployed find new employment They are sometimes specifically excluded by age 
from re-training or employment promotion schemes and are hardly ever targeted for 
special measures  . 
• For the minority still working at retirement age, there is the risk of mandatory 
retirement or loss of protection against dismissal. 
• Raising retirement ages, without changing employers' practice of targeting 
older workers for job losses, will increase discrimination by extending the period 
between loss of employment and retirement age, and by reducing pensions. 
The main recommendations for action at EC and national levels: 
• Public authorities to act to outlaw the most blatant forms of discrimination: 
-a  European-wide ban on age limits in recruitment advertisements 
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-abolish age limits which exclude older workers from training or 
employment promotion measures 
- remove any obligation to take early retirement, so that all schemes are 
voluntary  · 
- ensure final pensions are not disproportionately affected by early loss of 
employment and guarantee minimum social benefits for all older unemployed until 
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• Public authorities to introduce measures aimed at changing attitudes towards 
employment of older workers: 
- incentives to recruit and employ older unemployed and discouragement of 
redundancies among older workers 
- dialogue at national and European level with employers and trade unions to 
promote positive attitudes and employment initiatives 
• Public authorities to provide targeted assistance for training of older workers, 
both at work and in unemployment, and for employment promotion measures for the 
older unemployed • 
• A programme of measures to combat age discrimination at work should draw 
on good practice from across the Community. 
Part 1: Analysis of findings 
The maln findings of the report are contained ln Part 1, which analyses the age 
dtscrlmlnatory measures identified ln five different chapters and makes recommenda-
tions accordingly: 
Chapter 1: Early loss of employment 
·Workers over 55, or earlter, are targeted by employers for Job losses ln all countries. 
• They can be obltged to leave work through compulsory redundancies or early 
retirement schemes. 
• 'Voluntary' early retirement or redundancy offers, are ln practice often 
obltgatory under social pressure and employers' persuasive tactics. 
• Older workers appear to be over-represented ln redundancies, although very 
few age-related figures exist. 
·In southern Europe (Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy) and the former GDR,the older 
unemployed suffer severe loss of Income and in some cases large reductions ln final 
pensions. 
• Older unemployed women are a particular Income risk group ln all countries, 
due to shorter working ltves and lower entitlements to benefits and pensions. 
Chapter 2: No return to employment: discrimination in recruitment 
• Age dtscrlmlnatlon ln recruitment starts from age 40 in most countries. 
• The unemployed over 50 have very ltttle chance of finding another permanent Job. 
· In France, legislation bans the use of age ltmtts in Job advertisements ln the 
private sector - but is not enforced. 
• The use of age ltmtts ln advertisements ls only a small indicator of widespread 
age barriers during recruitment procedures. 
Chapter 3: The older unemployed: hidden and forgotten 
• Unemployment ln Itself is not age dtscrtmlnatory, but the absence of assistance 
for the older unemployed, compared wlth other age groups, ls discrlmlnatory. 
• 3 countries exclude older workers by age from employment measures for the 
unemployed. 
• Almost no government measures are targeted on the older unemployed, wlth 
the exception of France (Belgium, Germany and Spain each have one marginal 
scheme). 
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• 7 countries exclude the older unemployed from age 55 onwards from 
unemployment statistics by granting automatic benefits and exempting them from the 
need to register for work. 
Chapter 4: Exclusion from training 
• Older workers are significantly under-represented in training schemes both in methods 
work and for the unemployed  . 
• Training schemes which are avaUable for older workers often use teaching 
designed for young people, and unsuited to those wtth years of work experience  . 
• Older workers self-dtscrtmtnate by not taking up opportunities for training which 
do extst. 
Publtc sector training for unemployed: 
• No EC country provides targeted training schemes for the older unemployed, despite 
thetr special needs for re-training  . 
• 5 countries set age ltmtts which exclude older people from general training schemes 
for adult unemployed: Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and UK. The training schemes 
whtch are open to older unemployed. 
Employers' training at work: 
·Participation in company training decreases sharply after the age of 40 or 45, 
but these general trends have not yet been statistically proven. 
Chapter 5: Discrimination at retirement age 
• Reaching retirement age can mean an automatic end to the working llfe, or can 
result in the loss of workers' rights, such as the mintmum wage, for those still 
working. 
• Existing poltcles whtch raise retirement ages usually impose a longer working 
llfe and/or reduced pensions. 
Part 2: Positive measures to combat age- Europe and the United States 
A summary of measures to assist or protect older workers, and consideration of the 
scope and impact of anti-age discrimination legislation in the USA. 
Chapter 6: Positive measures in Europe 
·Spain ls the only country to have specific protection against age dtscrtmlnation 
in labour law. 
• Some constitutional protection against age discrtmlnation extsts in other 
countries and has led to national court rulings in favour of older workers  . 
• Only France has introduced systematic legislative measures to discourage loss of 
employment and promote a longer working llfe for older workers. But these have had 
ltttle effect, due to dlfficulty of changing the 'early retirement culture'. 
• Some positive measures extst as exceptions in other countries  . 
• Examples of good practice by employers and trade unions are evident, but 
systematic information is needed to establtsh real trends in thls area. 
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Chapter 7: Anti Age Discrimination legislation in the USA 
• The American Age Dtscrlmlnatlon ln Employment Act (ADEA) (  19  6 7) has 
- succeeded ln protecting older workers' rights ln employment and ln 
ellmlnatlng blatant forms of dlscrlmlnatlon; 
- not Improved general employment opportunities for older workers, nor changed the 
maJority of employers' underlying attitudes towards older workers. 
• Its comprehensive legislative approach ls not a suitable model for Europe, but 
partial legislation, based on some aspects of the ADEA, could be used to combat dtrect 
dtscrlmlnation ln Europe. 
Part 3: The European context and the potential for future action 
Age discrlmlnation has so far been analysed ln terms of its Impact on individual older 
workers. Thls section considers age discrlmlnatlon in today's European context and the 
potential for future action to combat discrlmlnatory practices. 
Chapter 8: The key actors: governments, social partners, 
older workers and society 
• At present, age dtscrlmlnatory practices appear to be accepted by all the key 
actors, including older workers themselves. 
·Governments have a potential economic incentive to promote employment of 
older workers, as thelr numbers increase and soctal security costs escalate  . 
• Employers, however, will need to reduce thelr workforce ln the recession and 
are llkely to continue targeting older workers for Job losses. 
• An active approach by trade unions in defendtng older workers' rights at work 
could help to change employers' attitudes. 
• Older workers themselves also need to be aware of how to improve thelr work 
prospects in the future. 
Chapter 9: The potential for European action 
·Comprehensive legislation to protect older workers' rights, as ln the USA, is 
not suited to European needs. 
· Economlc and demographic factors could persuade European governments to 
promote increased employment opportuntttes for older workers - and so help to 
combat age discrlmlnation. 
• Partial legislative action by governments could clearly indicate a change of 
policy towards older workers and promote public debate. 
• But legislation alone will not change employment practices, since employers' 
current interests appear to be opposed to employing older workers. 
• A long-term educational approach, backed by financial incentives and partial 
legislation, is needed to change attitudes among employers, trade unions and society 
in general. 
Part 4: Conclusions and recommendations for action 
The final part puts forward a series of more detatled recommendations, based on the 
findings of the author and of the national correspondents. 
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Introduction 
There are nearly 60 mllllon people aged between 50 and 64 ln the EC, representing 
about one quarter of the working age populatlon.
1 Yet increasing numbers of them stop 
work well before retirement age, and in most EC countries less than half of those aged 
50 to 64 are working or actively seeking work.
2 
This report raises the question of whether older people, now llvtng longer and healthier 
llves than ever before, are losing their 'right to work' ln later llfe simply on grounds of 
age. 
This ls the first European study to focus directly on age dlscrlmlnatlon against older 
workers ln employment. The sltuatlon of older workers ls considered ln the context of 
an lndtvidual'  s right to work: measures which unfairly restrict their choice to work -
on grounds of age - are defined as dlscrlmlnatory. 
The study provides a prellmtnary analysts of discriminatory measures tn EC countries 
and alms to promote awareness across Europe of the concept of age dtscrtmtnatton in 
employment.  It also calls for action by the European Community and national govern-
ments to outlaw such age dlscrlmlnatton wtth the atm of establtshing more equality of 
opportunity for older workers in the labour market. These same principles of equal 
opportunities and cltlzens' rights form the basts for exlsttng sex and race dtscrtmtnatton 
measures in Europe. 
Eurollnk Age initiated this report against a background of growing concern in 
European polltlcal circles about dlscrlmlnatlon against older workers and of increasing 
awareness of the Issue among the European publlc. A clear maJority of all ages across 
the EC believe that older workers are dlscrtmtnated against in employment and 
supports government action to stop age dtscrtminatton. 
3 
1  Definitions 
The term 'age dlscrtmtnatton' ts not yet widely used across Europe, although tt ts a 
recognised legal concept tn other countries such as the USA,  Canada and Australta. 
This report deals only with dtscrtminatton against older workers tn employment, 
although age dtscrtmtnatlon occurs tn other fields, such as health care or insurance, 
and can also be directed against young people. 
1.1  Age discrimination in employment 
Age dtscrtmtnatton tn employment removes or restricts the individual's freedom to 
exercise hts right to work. Dlscrlmlnatory measures can obllge workers at a set age to 
leave work early, or exclude them from applying for Jobs or from tratntng and employ-
ment promotion schemes after a certain age. 
Older workers are broadly defined as those aged over 50. Dlscrtmtnatlon starts at differ-
ent ages, however, and specific ages are quoted wherever possible. For example, discrim-
ination in recruitment starts from around 40, whereas early e:xlt from work affects 
large numbers from 55 onwards. 
The main focus ls on workers below the official retirement age- which ls 65 ln most 
EC countries (see Table 1). Some consideration ls, however, given to those who are stlll 
working at and beyond retirement age. 
Two main types of dlscrtminatton have been Identified: 
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· Direct discrimination: measures targeted at older workers based solely on 
grounds of age, and on no other factors, such as abilities or health. These measures 
use specific age llmlts to exclude older workers from, for example, tralnlng and 
employment schemes, or from applying for Jobs. 
• Indirect discrimination: measures which are not directly age-specific, but 
which have a disproportionately negative impact on older workers, compared wlth 
other age groups. This hidden discrlmlnation usually has the most widespread nega-
tive impact on older workers ln employment. 
In some cases, the measures might appear neutral, or even favourable for older workers, 
but in practice are used to their disadvantage. For example, 'voluntary' redundancy 
offers are often targeted on older workers and become obligatory in practice due to 
social pressures. 
There is also evidence of self-discrlmlnatlon by older workers who do not apply for 
certain measures, such as company tralnlng programmes. 
2  Scope 
The study identifies statutory measures and some employers' practices in EC countries 
which dtscrtmtnate on grounds of age against older workers in employment. It also 
highlights existing positive measures tn Europe which are specifically designed to help 
older workers in employment, and describes the anti-age discrimination legislation of 
the United States. Finally, tt examines the potential and makes recommendations for 
future action to combat age dlscrtmlnation ln the EC in the context of prevailing 
economic and employment conditions. 
The impact of employers' and trade unions' practices in relation to discrtmtnatlon 
against older workers has been considered only superficially in this preliminary study, 
due to lack of detaUed information. These important areas need separate tnvestlgatton. 
The employment practices examined are those which apply to the majority of workers: 
special measures taken on health or public safety grounds tn specific professions or 
industry sectors have not been investigated, although 1t is acknowledged that these have 
provoked debate in some countries. 
Other European studies
4 have analysed the overall employment problems of older work-
ers ln the context of publlc policies and labour market trends. This report alms to 
complement, rather than repeat such studies, by tts focus on age discrtmlnation. 
Nevertheless, many of lts conclusions for further action wlthtn the general labour 
market context are the same as those proposed elsewhere. 
3  Methodology 
The report was compUed on the basts of 12 national reports: 11 from EC countries5 and 
one from the USA. Information provided on individual countries is taken from the 
national reports and comments by the correspondents, unless otherwise indicated. The 
national correspondents are listed in Annex 1. 
As part of the study, two working meetings of correspondents were organised, to discuss 
the scope of the study in the preparatory stages, and to identify common and isolated 
practices of direct and indirect discrimination. Thls report is based on the findings of 
these meetings and on the national reports commissioned by Eurolink Age on age 
discrtmlnatlon and older workers. 
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Notes 
1. Eurostat population figures. 
2. EUROSTAT: development of the acUvlty rate ln the 50-64 age group,  1991. 
3. Eurobarometer survey: 'Age and Attitudes', commissioned for the European Year of Older People, 
1993. 
4. OECD (1992) and Institute of Personnel  Management,  UK (1993), among others. 
5. Luxembourg ls not Included. 
14 Age discrimination against older workers in the European Community 
Background: older workers and employment in the EC 
Brief information on the current situation of older workers in employment is provided 
in this section, as background for the analysis of discrlmlnatory measures which 
follows. 
1 The European context 
1.1  Demography 
[The participation of older people in the workforce has begun to feature on the 
European political agenda, largely due to demographic trends.] A;lmost all EC countries 
wlll have significantly increased numbers of workers over 50 in the first two decades of 
the next century, although the tlmlng wlll vary between countries. By 2005, the OECD 
estimates that half of all workers wlll be over 40. 
1.2  Trend towards early exit 
Although many workers begin to leave work after 50, participation in the labour 
market decreases sharply after 55 in several countries, with only Just over one half of 
those aged 55 to 59 in the EC remaining economically active, and only one quarter of 
those aged 60 to 64 (see Annex 1). 
Activity and employment rates for male workers' over 55 have steadily declined across 
Europe since the oil crisis and high unemployment of the late 70s. UntU then, older 
workers were virtually (protected and privileged on seniority principles, and] guaran-
teed lifelong employment. But from the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, increasing 
numbers were encouraged to take early retirement. These schemes were developed both 
by public authorities and companies, with the agreement of trade unions, in response 
to rising unemployment in this period. 
1.3  Economic factors: 
The predicted negative GDP growth in most countries and a rise in the EC unemploy-
ment rate to 12% in 1994
7 will inevitably provoke further Job losses as recession 
spreads across the Community. 
The costs of supporting early exit from work fall mainly on governments - either 
through subsidies for early exit schemes or unemployment benefits. They have already 
risen significantly and as numbers of older workers increase, all governments wtll face 
escalating costs unless the current early exit trend is reversed. 
The chances of reversing the trend are not good in the short-term, however, due to the 
recession. Restructuring of traditional manufacturing industries such as steel, mining, 
and textiles is likely to continue and service industries, such as the retail sector, wlll 
also contract. 
2  Types of early exit 
Older workers leave work early in two main ways: 
• early or pre-retirement schemes or 
• redundancy or dismissal. 
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2.1  Early and pre-retirement schemes 
There are two main types of scheme: 
• early retirement, giving early access to the state pension, as 1n Germany; and 
• pre-retirement, paying special allowances untll (early) pensionable age, as 1n 
France. 
Invalldtty pensions are also commonly used as early retirement schemes in some coun-
tries, such as the Netherlands. 
Entry Into early or pre-retirement schemes can be direct from employment, or after a 
period of unemployment. Either way. the older worker has a guaranteed income unttl 
official retirement age. 
These schemes are widely developed and provide good financial benefits in northern 
Europe In: Belgium, Germany. Denmark, France and the Netherlands. They also extst to 
some extent, providing far less generous benefits, In: former East Germany. Spain, Italy 
and Portugal. 
Redundancy or dismissals 
Redundancy or dismissals are the main or only means of ensuring early exlt in: former 
East Germany. Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy. Portugal and the UK. But they are also 
widely used 1n countries with well-developed early retirement schemes. 
Workers made redundant or dismissed usually receive a compensatory payment and 
then become unemployed, very often long-term. They depend on unemployment 
benefits and/or social assistance until retirement age. 
3 Pension and benefit levels 
Pension levels and unemployment benefits vary substantially between EC countries. and 
also between groups wlthln a country. Varying Income levels both before and after 
official retirement age affect the financial needs of Individuals to work. 
3.1  Early pensions and pre-retirement allowances 
The Income provided by early and pre-retirement schemes varies across Europe. In 
northern Europe, such schemes pay between 60% and 100% or more of the former 
salary. whereas 1n southern Europe, an early pension or pre-retirement allowance often 
imposes a large reduction 1n Income compared with previous earnings. 
3.2  Unemployment after redundancy or dismissal 
Unemployment benefits and other forms of social assistance represent the least secure 
income for workers before pensionable age. Redundancy payments vary between coun-
tries and types of companies. Larger companies usually provide the most generous 
terms, which are sometimes equivalent to the favourable pre-retirement schemes. 
Smaller companies tend to pay the minimum legal requirement and leave their former 
employees dependent on state benefits. 
In northern Europe, the older unemployed who are not covered by early exit schemes 
or generous redundancy packages are at the lower end of income scales. In southern 
European countries the low levels or absence
8 of social assistance after unemployment 
benefits run out force many older unemployed into poverty. 
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3.3  Retirement pensions 
Final pension levels at retirement age vary across the EC and within countries and 
closely affect the individual worker's need or wish to continue working. 
Average national levels hide big inequalities in pension income between different groups 
of pensioners, especially between those in receipt of occupational pensions and those 
dependent on state old age pensions alone. Workers who have had long terms of unem-
ployment before reaching retirement age (including a disproportionate number of 
women) may receive lower pensions under a contributory scheme. 
4  Factors affecting employment opportunities 
Workers over 50 are not a homogenous group and their employinent prospects vary 
according to sex, skllls and sector of employment. 
For example, managers and highly skllled workers are more llkely to remain at work for 
longer than lower sktlled workers. In several countries, the employment prospects and 
conditions of publlc sector employees are significantly better than those 1n the private 
sector. 
4.1  Common factors 
A number of common factors can be identified which affect employment opportunities 
for older workers, in addition to the age discriminatory practices analysed later: 
4.1.1  Personnel costs of  older workers 
The seniority system of increasing wages with age still operates in most EC countries, 
making older employees more expensive to employ. Various special privUeges and 
benefits, such as increased holldays and reduced working hours, also contribute to 
higher overall personnel costs. 
4.1.2  EduCQtlon and qualljiCQtlons 
Today's workers over 50 have lower educational levels than thelr younger colleagues. 
They are less llkely to have had vocational training before starting work and tend to 
have fewer qualifications as a result. This affects thelr aptitude for ongoing training 
during thelr working ltves. However, these disadvantages may be reduced with future 
generations. 
4.1.3  Physical condition and health 
Health and strength can deteriorate both as a result of age and of past working condi-
tions. Special concessions are made for older workers on night and shlft working, or Job 
transfers to less physically demanding tasks. The introduction of new technologies are 
reducing these physical disadvantages. 
4.2  The positive aspects of older staff should not be ignored or forgotten: 
4.2.1 Productivity 
Although it appears to be widely assumed that productivity decllnes with age, an OECD 
study
10 concludes, on the basts of various studies, that productivity at work varies more 
within age groups than between them. Experience shows that productivity of older 
workers can be effectively increased by training. 
10 
4.2.2 Advantages of  older workers 
Experienced older workers can be a valuable resource for employers. They are 
less likely to change employer, and they tend to have higher levels of loyalty to a 
company after long service, so enhancing stability in the workforce. 
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Notes 
6.  Those for women have varled due to Increases In labour force partlclpatlonfor female workers In 
some countries. 
7.  European Commission economlcforecastfor 1994. 
8.  In Greece. 
9.  Maguire,  Marla (1988). 
10. See Part 2, Positive measures by companies In Greece and the Netherlands for examples. 
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Age discrimination in employment -
analysis of findings 
The main findings of the report are contained in this section, which analyses the age 
dlscrlminatory measures Identified in jive dlfferent chapters. Age discrimination against older workers in the European Community 
The dlscrlmlnatory measures against older workers in employment, as identified by the 
national reports, are analysed below in five different chapters: 
• early loss of employment 
• no return to employment: dlscrlminatlon in recruitment 
• the older unemployed: hidden and forgotten 
• exclusion from training 
• retirement age. 
Wlthln each sector, measures of direct and indirect dlscrlminatlon are identified (See 
page 13). Indlcatlons of posltlve measures are also given, where they exist, and these 
are more fully described in Part 2. Specific recommendations for action are proposed at 
the end of each sector. 
Consequences for the individual worker 
In assessing the consequences of each type of age dlscrlminatlon for the individual, 
three maln aspects are considered: 
• access to employment 
·income 
• free choice. 
Access to employment 
Access to employment can be dented both by the loss of a Job and py problems in 
re-entering the labour market after a certain age. 
Loss of employment does not automatically constitute age dlscrlmlnatlon, however. 
Dlscrlminatlon occurs where older workers are targeted for Job losses solely on grounds 
of age, regardless of their ablllttes. 
In terms of re-entering the labour market, dlscrlminatlon takes place where age 
excludes a Job-seeker from applying or being considered for a Job, or from re-training 
opportunities. 
Income 
Employment ls prtmarlly an economic actlvlty, providing an income for a worker and 
hts famtly. Where early loss of employment leads to significant income reductions, the 
negative impact of dlscrtminatlon ls increased. 
The income consequences of early Job loss vary between different EC countries and are 
examined where appropriate. Substantial and permanent reductions in income are 
hlghllghted as a form of 'income dlscrtminatlon' ln certain countries. 
Principle of free choice 
The choice or 'right' to work ls avallable to ever fewer older workers today. Increasing 
numbers are excluded from employment, against their wtll: they may need or wtsh to 
work for financial, personal or social reasons. 
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Chapter 1 - Early loss of employment 
Early loss of employment on grounds of age is the most serious form of age dlscrtmlna-
tlon In Europe, since most older workers have ltttle chance of re-entering the labour 
market. Targeting older workers effectively means an end to their working ltfe and 
exclusion from the workforce for 10 or more years before official retirement age. 
It is true that many workers in northern Europe welcome the opportunity to retire early 
with good financial benefits; yet for many others, a premature end to working ltfe is not 
freely chosen and results In financial and social disadvantages. This analysts of dtscrtml-
nation focuses on the latter group. 
Direct discrimination occurs where statutory provisions allow employers to obltge work-
ers to leave work early at a set age. Indirect dlscrtmtnatlon happens when workers are 
'encouraged' to leave work at a set age through offers of redundancy or early retirement 
schemes; the 'voluntary' nature of these measures is often ln practice only theoretical. 
Indirect discrimination also occurs when older workers are over-represented In mass 
compulsory redundancies, which should theoretically affect all age groups. 
Early extt has been divided Into two types for the purpose of analysing 
dtscrtmlnation: 
• redundancy or dismissal leading to unemployment; and 
• early or pre-retirement schemes. 
Both types include examples of direct and indirect dtscrtminatlon. 
Exceptionally In thts chapter, the serious loss of income after early extt in some coun-
tries has been treated In a separate section. 
1 Redundancy or dismissal 
Older workers most frequently become unemployed through compulsory redundancy or 
dtsmtssal, or acceptance of 'voluntary' redundancy offers. In practice, the distinction 
between voluntary and compulsory extt ts blurred as many workers accept voluntary 
redundancy under pressure or threat of future compulsory measures. 
Redundancy and dismissals are widely used In all countries, especially in countries 
without well-developed early and pre-retirement schemes; in other countries, significant 
numbers of workers do not qualtfy for them and remain long-term unemployed. This 
appltes particularly to employees of small and medium-sized companies which do not 
participate in pre- retirement schemes. 
Since no public poltctes allow direct selection of older workers for compulsory 
redundancy there ls no blatant discrtmlnatton by age. All countries report that older 
workers suffer particularly from these measures, but very few age-related statistics exist 
to prove thts trend. 
1.1  Direct discrimination: obligatory exit 
Older workers are over-represented in tradtttonalindustrles such as textiles, steel, 
mining, and car industries. In southern European countries and the former GDR, indus-
tries are undergoing large-scale restructuring. In the former GDR, mass redundancies 
are In practice targeted on workers aged 55 or younger, with the effect that in some 
industry sectors almost no workers over 55 remain. 
Greece reports that many small and medium-sized companies systematically dismiss 
workers after 3 5 and replace them wtth younger, cheaper labour to avoid paying higher 
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Early exit from work: early or pre-retirement schemes 
Country  Dired 
disalmination 
8  NO 
OK  NO 
0  NO 
ex-GDR  YES 
GR  YES 
E  YES 
YES 
F  YES 
IRL  NO 
YES 
l 
Nl  NO 
p  YES 
UK  NO 





55  Obligatory ER in practice.  YES 
ER benefrts are only 'option' 
after compulsory redundancy 
55162  Dismissal with early pension 
for working mothers at 55; 
or men at 62 
60  Obligatory early pension for 
unemployed (with 40% 
pension reduction) 
Obligatory ER schemes 
50/55  Obligatory ER schemes 
50/55  Obligatory ER for men 
45/47  Obligatory ER for women 









Age  Measures 
55  'Voluntary' ER schemes 
60  'Voluntary' ER, but socially 'expected' 
58/60  Effective ER at 58 for unemployed; 
60 for women; 63 for men 
60/63  Early pensions for women, 
unemployed and men 
Voluntary ER schemes 
50/55  Voluntary ER schemes 
Voluntary ER schemes 
57.5/60  Voluntary ER schemes 
Voluntary ER schemes 
'ER' is used as an abbreviation to cover both  ear~ access to state pension, as well as pre-retirement allowances paid until 
pensionable age. Both types of measure remove workers from the labour force. 
Table A 
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salaries llinlted to length of service. In large, non-profitable texttle, metal and mining 
companies in Greece workers over 40 have been targeted on cost grounds for Job losses, 
as well as in public enterprises undergoing prlvatlsatlon. 
The absence of protection against unfair dismissal or redundancy on grounds of age in 
several countries (Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland
11
,  Portugal, UK) allows employers 
greater potential to select older workers in practice. Yet where legal protection exists, it 
does not always work In practice: in Spain, for example, employers can use two 'objec-
tive clauses' for legal dismissal of older workers, based on inability to adapt to technical 
modifications; and lnablltty to perform a Job sattsfactortly. 
It appears difficult to discourage employers from targeting older workers. In France, the 
financial penalties Imposed on companies, equivalent to 6 months' salary for each 
worker made redundant at 50, have had little practical effect and It Is felt the financial 
disincentive Is insufficient. 
1.2  Indirect discrimination: 'voluntary' redundancy 
Older workers may accept so-called 'voluntary' redundancies as better financial alterna-
tives to mass compulsory redundancy terms. Their effect Is to obllge older workers to 
leave work against their will, they constitute a form of direct but hidden dlscrlmlnatlon. 
Due to the lack of comparable age-based statistics, only individual examples can be 
quoted on the basts of the national reports: for example, Flat in Turin offered 'volun-
tary' redundancy to 25% of Its workforce In 1992 and most of the 5,000 who accepted 
were aged 50-55. 
Trade unions often appear to condone these practices, on the basts that redundancy 
and unemployment Is more acceptable for older than for younger workers. In the UK, 
for example, trade unions sometimes campaign for 'voluntary' redundancy measures, 
in practice targeted at older workers, in order to avoid compulsory redundancies spread 
across all age-groups. 
1.3  Positive measures 
Some protection against dismissal or redundancy on grounds of age exists In several 
countries. There are laws In Spain, Italy and the Netherlands; and soon possibly In 
Ireland. Collective agreements protect many older workers In Germany. Greek case law 
provides protection in principle. In France, the law discourages selection of older work-
ers and financial penalties are Imposed on employers making workers redundant at 50. 
2 Early or pre-retirement schemes 
Early and pre-retirement schemes set specific age targets for leaving work, regardless of 
health or abtllty. These are usually around the age of 55, but can be earlier. Many 
schemes were designed as positive measures to protect older workers or allow them to 
retire early after a long working life. However, the financial incentives provided, 
combined with the need for workforce reductions, have encouraged employers to use or 
abuse the schemes In order to oblige older workers to leave work as soon as they are 
entitled to the benefits. 
Direct dlscrlmlnation occurs where such schemes are compulsory. Most are voluntary, 
however, and therefore constitute hidden, or indirect dlscrtmlnatlon, even If persuasive 
pressures on older workers often make them obligatory in practice. 
However, in the context of high unemployment, many older workers and trade unions 
in northern Europe see early and pre-retirement schemes as an acquired right to be 
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defended, ln preference to unemployment. Indeed, older workers ln southern Europe 
would welcome slmllar schemes. 
Yet, workers ln early or pre-retirement effectively give up their right to work. Other paid 
employment is either prohibited, or strictly llmlted untll official retirement age. Enforced 
lnactlvlty12 from 55 or earller for 25-30 remaining years of llfe is against the incllnatlon 
and abllltles of many older people. The right to retire early is becoming opposed to the 
right to work13• 
2.1  Direct disaimination: obligatory exit 
2 .1.1  Pre-reUrement schemes 
Obllgatory early or pre-retirement schemes exist in the former GDR, Spain, France, 
Italy, and Portugal. They usually involve redundancy and immediate access to an early 
pension or pre-retirement allowances. In some cases, the older unemployed are obliged 
to join the schemes. 
In France there is widespread acceptance of these longstanding, well-financed schemes, 
and of an 'early retirement' culture. 
In Spain, Italy and Portugal, the schemes are more llmtted and have only been intro-
duced in recent years. Early retirement very often means a substantial loss of income. It 
is seen as another form of redundancy, speclfically targeted by age, and the obllgation 
to leave is almost always against the older worker's wtll. 
In the former GDR, after German reunification, pre-retirement allowances were offered 
to large numbers of older workers made redundant between 1989 and 1993
14
• from 55 
unttl an early pension at 60. Over 1 mtllion older workers are now covered by these 
schemes. Although notionally 'voluntary', they were in practice obllgatory. The very 
low llmtts of earned income allowed during the pre-retirement period increase East 
German workers' opposition to these measures. 
2.1.2  Early pensions 
In Germany, Greece, Spain and Italy workers can be obliged to take an early pension up 
to 5 years before the standard retirement age. 
In Greece, maternity provisions allow working mothers to claim their pension at 55, 5 
years before the official retirement age for women. In practice this positive measure has 
been used by employers to cut costs since they are legally allowed to dismiss workers 
with paying only 50% of redundancy compensation as soon as they become ellgible for 
a full pension. Men ellgible for an early pension at 62 can also be dismissed on the 
same grounds. 
In Spain, all those unemployed at age 60 are obllged to take early retirement and to 
accept a 40% permanent reduction in their state pension (see below: Loss of income). 
In Italy, workers in certain industries, such as steel and ship butldlng, undergoing 
restructuring or in economic crisis can be obllged to retire with an early state pension 
at SO or 55 for men and 4 5 or 4 7 for women. 
In Germany, untll1992, employment contracts could oblige workers to leave when 
they were entitled to an early state pension. This mainly affected women and disabled 
workers at the age of 60. 
2.2  Indirect discrimination: 'voluntary' exit 
2.2.1  Early pensions 
In Germany, the option of an early full pension at 60 for unemployed and disabled 
people and all women, and at 63 for men has become lnstltutlonalised as the 'normal' 
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Redundancy or dismissals leading to unemployment 
This table analyses redundancies or dtsmlssals which result ln unemployment, without 
access to early or pre-retirement schemes. 
Direct targettlng by age for redundancy or dismissal does not officially exist. In practice, 
indirect dtscrtmtnatlon through selection of older workers Is widespread. 
Country  Dlred disaimlnation:  lndired disalmlnation: 
Offidal targeting by age  Targeting by age in pradice 
B  NO  YES 
OK  NO  YES 
D  NO  (positive measures)  YES 
ex-GDR  NO  YES* 
GR  NO  (positive measures)  YES 
E  NO  (positive measures)  YES 
F  NO  (positive measures)  YES 
IRL  NO  (positive measures)  YES 
NO  (positive measures)  YES 
NL  NO  (positive measures)  YES 
p  NO  (positive measures)  YES 
UK  NO  YES 
Main fadors appplicable in all countries 
1 Companies needing to reduce workforce target older workers for redundancy. 
2 Mass redundancies mainly in traditional industries with high numbers of older workers. 
3 'Voluntary' redundancy offers to older workers are linked with social pressures and fear of 
alternative mass redundancy with lower financial benefits. 
4 Higher personnel costs of older workers leads to targeting on cost. 
5 State provision of automatic unemployment benefrts to older unemployed** encourages 
employers to target them. 
*  In ex-GDR mass redundancies have affected large numbers of workers from 55 and earlier. 
**not applicable in Greece. 
Table  B 
25 Age discrimination against older workers in the European Community 
retirement age and only a small minority work untU 65
15
• For women in particular, the 
age of 60 acts as an effective upper llmlt, due to social expectations. Workers 
unemployed for 18 months or more quallfy. In practice, employers use the early 
pension to get rid of workers at age 58 or before. 
In Portugal, the unemployed at 60 who have exhausted their entitlement to unemploy-
ment benefits, extended untll age 60, may clalm an early old age pension. In practice, 
the majority do so for financial reasons, despite the low level of the state pension. 
2.2.2  Pre-retirement and lnvalldlty schemes 
Voluntary pre-retirement schemes are common in Belgium, Denmark, France, and the 
Netherlands. They exlst to a llmited extent in Spain, Italy and Portugal. Private sector 
redundancy schemes whlch act llke pre-retirement schemes, are increasingly common 
in the UK. 
The social pressure on older workers from employers, trade unions and work colleagues 
to accept these schemes is often intense and makes the schemes in practice obltgatory. 
Thls is particularly noticeable where schemes are devised on the grounds of 'soltdartty' 




In some countries, such as Denmark, Greece
17 and the Netherlands, early invalldity 
pensions are a major means of early exit. Older workers with low levels of dtsabtlity 
may quallfy for fullinvalldity benefits with the support of the examining doctors. Older 
workers are actively encouraged by trade unions and employers to apply for these 
schemes in the same way as for pre-retirement measures. 
2.3  Positive measures 
In Germany a 1992 law
11 effectively outlaws employers' contracts whlch obltge workers 
to retire with an early pension. 
Some obligatory pre-retirement schemes in the Netherlands were successfully 
challenged and prohibited by a court rullng in 1982
19
• 
Action has been taken in Belgium, Denmark and Germany to reduce employer incen-
tives to use the schemes by transferring costs of early retirement to industry; the scope 
of their schemes has also been restricted, in France as well. In Germany, except for 
disabled workers, the early retirement ages will be phased out. 
3  Loss of income: the poverty risk 
At any tlme of life loss of employment usually means loss of income. In southern 
European countries and the former GDR many older workers suffer a serious loss of 
income as a result of early exlt. Where older workers and their famtlies risk absolute or 
relative poverty, they can be considered to suffer age dtscrlminatlon related to income. 
3.1  Direct discrimination: reduction in final pension 
In Spain and Greece, early loss of employment for older workers removes their rights to 
a full pension, regardless of the number of years' contributions paid during their previ-
ous working llves. 
Their state pensions are calculated on income during the last five years before retire-
ment age. If  workers are unemployed for part or all of this period, they receive only the 
minimum pension on reaching retirement age. 
In Spain, those who are already unemployed at 60 are obllged to take an early pension 
at that age. This results in a 40% permanent reduction in their final pension, based on 
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a reduction coefficient of 8% per year. 12.5% of the total population aged 60-64 were 
affected by thls ln 199020• 
In former East Germany, the final pension for workers made redundant at 55, related to 
their contribution record, ls reduced by two factors: by receiving an early pension at 
60, and for paying lower contributions between 55 and 60, based on low pre-
retirement allowance rates. Severely restricted in terms of alternative earned lncome2
1
, 
they are not able to increase their pension contributions durlng thls period. 
These pension reductions contrast with other countries, such as Italy, where obllgatory 
early retirement schemes include cover to make up the mlsslng years of pension contri-
butions. 
3.2  Indirect discrimination: severe financial hardship in unemployment 
In Greece, unemployed workers receive no other social benefits, once unemployment 
benefits run out after up to 12 months. For older unemployed unllkely to find other 
employment, this severe financial hardship can last for 10 or more years untU retire-
ment age. Even then, they receive only a mlnlmum pension, due to their period of 
unemployment. 
In other southern European countries - Spaln, Italy and Portugal - unemployment and 
related benefits are relatively low, lmposing substantial loss of income on the older 
unemployed, although some benefits are paid untU pensionable age. 
Many older unemployed in these countries are forced into the black economy or into 
marginal part-tlme Jobs and temporary agricultural work ln order to earn some lncome 
:untU retirement age. These Jobs are low paid and without social protection, so lmposing 
a double dlscrlmlnatlon on the older worker. 
3.2.1  Older women unemployed 
Unemployment for older women, especially unmarried older women, is even more likely 
to result ln poverty. Generally lower pay and shorter employment contribution records 
to earn entitlement to pension or unemployment benefits mean that older women need 
to work and can be hardest hlt by an obllgatlon to leave work early. 
4  Consequences, conclusions and recommendations 
4.1  Consequences 
4.1.1  Access to employment 
• dismissal or redundancy of workers over 50 means, for the vast majority, 
exclusion from employment untU retirement age. 
·early or pre-retirement almost always excludes any other paid employment 
and lmposes enforced inactivity. 
4.1.2  Income 
·income is reduced for almost all older unemployed. 
• in southern Europe, substantial loss of income can result in poverty: this 
constitutes 'income dlscrlmlnation' against the older unemployed. 
·early and pre-retirement schemes provide different lncome levels: 
• to northern Europe the financial benefits are good and lncome ls protected. 
·in southern Europe and the former GDR, there ls often a substantial loss of 
income. 
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4.1.3  Principle of  choice 
• older workers have llttle or no real choice regarding early exit. Both obligatory 
and voluntary schemes are used to obllge the worker to leave against his will. 
4.2  Conclusions 
Enforced early loss of employment is the most widespread form of dlscrlminatlon 
against older workers. In view of the difficulties for older workers to re-enter the labour 
market, measures to reduce the numbers of those losing employment would be the 
most helpful to older workers. 
However, restrictions on existing early and pre-retirement schemes will not on their 
own reduce Job losses, since redundancy measures can be used in their place, which 
are financially less favourable. Employers need to be persuaded to change their work-
force reduction policies and to consider spreading necessary Job losses across all age 
groups of the workforce, instead of targeting older workers first. 
4.3  Recommendations for action 
4.3.1  Redundancy and dismissals 
i) Age-related statistics on redundancies, broken down by sex and industrial sector, 
should be collected and published in all countries in order to raise awareness of employ-
ers' targeting of older workers. 
11)  Employers should be discouraged from targeting workers for redundancy solely on 
grounds of age. 
4.3.2  Early and pre-retirement schemes 
i) Early and pre-retirement schemes should always be voluntary not obligatory. 
Obligatory schemes which Impose a substantial loss of income should be aboltshed first. 
11) Transfer of costs of early and pre-retirement onto companies should be used to 
discourage their widespread use in northern Europe. 
4.3.3  Loss of Income 
i) Methods of pension calculation should be changed to avoid penallsing older workers 
who leave the workforce early with substantial pension reductions. 
11)  No worker should be obliged to take early retirement where this results in large and 
permanent pension reductions. 
ttl) Adequate social benefits should be provided for all long-term unemployed untU 
pensionable age. 
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Notes 
11. a draft law Is now under consideration to change this - see 'Positive measures'. 
12. At one stage In France even voluntary actlvltles were forbidden  In certain regionally-managed 
state (ASSEDIC) schemes. 
13. X Gaulller,  1993. 
14. 'Vorruhestand' early retirement option 1989-1990, replaced by old age transition benefit 
1990-1993. Redundant workers now have no pre-retirement option and remain long-term unemployed. 
15. The situation will change ln the next decade,  when German pension reforms come Into force, 
effectively raising the real retirement age to 65. 
16. the 'Vorruhestand' scheme stopped In 1988. 
17. access to disability pensions has been restricted/rom 1990. 
18. Law: SGB VI,  Article 41.4. 
19. Ktg Amsterdam, 30/11/82, Prg.  1983/8 p.233-238. 
20. OECD 1992. 
21. The Income llmlt Is one seventh of the monthly payment: DM390 per month In East Germany. 
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Chapter 2 - No return to employment: 
discrimination in recruitment 
....._ _  __.this: -.eelally If,..:  ..  a ........  · 
4W emploJet' of  ov•  4!1 ,...  ol  ap. 
I am a ~~  ID~  Ia company orpnlt  __  :and admiDitfntlqa  •. I ....  a.,.  \ 
diploma hoi  t.be DC 24 years qo  .. J:Jw.iDg that Ume I have worked as Me...,. Director aud  · 
Plnandalaad~Dnctorm4dlltinot~tes.  · ·  :··  ·  ·. 
'  '  . 
A few IJlC8dbt qo. for totally )usUIIable rea.-. I had tt) leave ~  «a,_..  l wat WD1Idq 
fOr. You eaa Jmaa1tM my surprise when, IDstem ef ftadiDI another Job strataht away, •I  had 
on prevloal occasloDS, I had 10 spend tJU.e mootbs lOoklna for a  Post similar. ID my-~ 
one. But, because of the fact that. four rnooths ago. i Q'DD'dtted the ten.'lble sin of nwhiDJ·my 
46th blrtbday. It appears that my chances of lnclloa auother·Job are extremely llraJt8cL \1te 
vadous compaDies I have Y1sltecL or to wblcb I. have teat my c:urdculum In respcao 0)  .their 
adverdsemeDtl. hav. tokt me - oft' the record, of  course - that almost nobody 'emploJs J*)ple  -
ofover4S. 
Prom these ,.._  I Wish  to appeal  to the aood nature of employers and ~aprs  aod to 
remiD4 them _that. although they may not yet have reached 45, th8, will one clay. and wllen 
they do 1:beJ will &eover that they anla  lae  phJtk:al and mental shape, With ·a &Nat &.1 of 
experience to draw on. 
Therefore. If  allJ(JDe Is lookiDa for a Plnaaeial aDi AdmlDistratlve Director with orer lO yean 
of experteDCe, who ts 11111 opUmlsUe and kec  to can)' on wortiD& please call me ...  " 
Personal advertlsement 1n:  'EL PAIS', 6 October 1992. 
This sector examines two types of employers' dlscrlmtnatlon against older workers in 
recruitment: 
• direct dlscrlmtnation in setting age llmits in recruitment advertisements; 
• indirect dlscrlmtnatlon through prejudice during the recruitment process. 
Older workers who become unemployed have very llttle chance of re-entering the 
labour market ln a permanent job. In Spain only 14% of unemployed workers over 55 
found a new permanent contract ln 1990
22
• In France, the unemployed over 50 have 
only a 12% chance of finding another job
23
•  Workers over 40 are affected ln many 
countries. 
Economic considerations of higher wage costs, outdated work skllls and possible health 
problems all reduce incentives for employers to recruit older workers in times of high 
unemployment and large labour supply. Other types of age dlscrlmtnatlon, such as lack 
of specific tralnlng provisions and the absence of targeted employment promotion 
measures for the older unemployed (see Chapters 3 and 4), reduce their chances of re-
employment. 'lbgether with widespread acceptance of early exlt from work from 50 
onwards, many employers are prejudiced against workers in their mid-forties onwards. 
The advertisement from 'El Pals' quoted above appears representative of off-the-record 
attitudes of many employers across Europe and reflects the frustration felt by well-
qualified older people at their automatic rejection because of age. 
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1 Direct discrimination: age limits set in recruitment advertisements 
The setting of maximum age llmits for recruitment, regardless of qualifications, experi-
ence or ablllty, is an arbitrary use of age. It is the clearest example of direct discrimina-
tion against older workers whlch is common to all
24 Member States. 
1.1  Private sector 
Maximum age llmlts from 35 onwards are commonly used in job advertisements in 
almost all countries, except France where legislation prohibits thls. West Germany and 
Italy report relatively low levels of use and in Denmark the practice is becoming less 
common. Other countries, including Spain, Greece and the UK, report significant 
proportions of around 40% of job advertisements containing upper age llmlts. Studies 
in thls field appear to be most advanced in the UK
25
• 
Most age llmlts apply to posts wlth career prospects and affect well-quallfied mana-
gerial-level workers. Unskilled manual vacancies are the least likely to set age llmlts
26
• 
Although employers and personnel managers are responsible for the decision to set age 
llmlts for specific posts, the newspapers and publications whlch carry the job advertise-
ments, state and private sector employment agencies, speciallsed employment consul-
tants and professional personnel bodies are also involved. There are few exceptions to 
the widespread acceptance of thls discriminatory practice (see below: Positive 
measures). 
In order for change to occur, all those involved in employment and recruitment 
processes need to be persuaded of the need for change. Legislation to outlaw the specific 
use of age llmlts in advertisements could be the most effective direct action, providing 
an Impetus for persuasive actions to lnfluence the recruitment process as a whole. 
1.2  Public sector 
The publlc sector and national clvtl services in six out of twelve Member States set 
maximum age llmlts for recruitment at all grades. These are typically between 32 and 
40. (See Table C) 
The six exceptions are: Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal wlth no age llmits up 
to retirement age; the UK, Belgium and Ireland with maximum llmlts of 50. 
It should be noted that the French legislation banning age limits appltes only to the 
private sector; publlc sector employers are exempt. 
The European Community institutions also apply maximum age llmits, usually 35, for 
recruitment to all grades of post. 
Whereas in the private sector, age llmits are most closely llnked to career jobs, in the 
publlc sector they often apply to all grades of post, including unsktlled jobs. For exam-
ple, the European Parllament last year advertised for 'attendants and removals men' 
wtth a maximum age of 25. It is dtfficult to Justify these low age llmtts where career 
prospects are so llmlted. 
In general, age ltmlts ln the publlc sector are associated wlth cumulative pension rlghts, 
whlch are often more favourable than private sector pensions. However, international 
institutions such as the United Nations and those national publtc sectors which do not 
set age llmlts have clearly overcome any problems with pension calculations. 
1.3  Positive measures 
Legislation has existed in France2
7 for many years to prohibit private sector employers 
stating age llmits in their recruitment advertisements. In practice, thls measure is not 
enforced and largely ignored by employers. 
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The Netherlands ls now considering Introducing slmllar legislation. The UK government 
has condemned the use of age llmlts, but ls opposed to legislation. There is Increasing 
publlc debate on the Issue ln both countries, which has led to various positive 
lnltlatives: for example, the UK national newspaper, The Guardian, has stopped publlsh-
lng job advertisements stating age llmits. 
In recent years, two national civll services, the UK and Ireland, have raised age llmlts 
for recruitment to SO. 
The European Community Counctl of Ministers raised its age llmlts to SO for 
recruitment advertisements ln late 1992, as an experimental policy. The three major EC 
Institutions are currently reviewing their pollcy on age llmlts in recruitment. 
2 Indirect discrimination: age barriers in the recruitment process 
In practice, Indirect age dlscrlmlnation during the recruitment process ls more 
widespread than the number of Job advertisements setting age llmlts. It affects much 
greater numbers of older Job-seekers as a result. 
All countries report widespread reluctance by employers to recruit workers from age 
40-45 onwards, although there are no systematic studies to support these observations. 
Rare exceptions to this general trend occur when there ls a shortage of speclfi.c skills in 
an Industry sector or in certain regions. 
Prejudice ln recruitment of older workers does not appear to be confined to well-
quallfi.ed posts. For example, ln Greece
21 indiv1duallnterv1ews confirmed that, ln some 
regions, manual workers over 45 are not even recruited for temporary work on 
construction sites, picktng ollves, or as street-sweepers, due to de facto discrlmlnation 
by employers on grounds of age. 
Non age-speclfi.c requirements used ln advertisements in order to discourage or disqual-
Ify older workers also constitute indirect dlscrlmtnatton. These typically Include phrases 
such as: 'dynamic', 'open to new ideas' or 'educationally well-quallfi.ed'. Agatn, no stud-
ies have been carried out in this field. 
In practice, lt appears that, even without speclfi.c use of age llmlts, many employers 
across Europe use age as a 'cut-off' polnt for recruitment and do not even read appllca-
tions quoting an age of 4 5 or over. Thls prejudice may often be based on negative 
stereotypes of the older worker. However, the systematic departure of over-50s from the 
workforce has encouraged employers to develop personnel pollcies geared towards shed-
ding older workers, not recrulttng them, and the resulting 'young' workforce presents a 
further potential obstacle to recruitment of older colleagues. 
Older women are particularly disadvantaged by age discrimination in recruitment since 
they are more llkely than men to be returning to work in their 40s and 50s after famtly 
commitments. 
2.1  Self-discrimination 
The stereotypes widely applled to older Job-seekers often undermine their confidence tn 
the possibllity of returning to work. As a result they are discouraged from applying for 
jobs at all. 
Legislation prohibiting the age llmtts ln Job descriptions would not by itself prevent 
discrlmtnation 1n recruitment procedures. Even in the USA, where the Age 
Dtscrtmlnatton ln Employment Act specifically covers the recruitment process, there are 
tndications that discrlmlnatlon in recruitment stUI persists, alongside negative attitudes 
towards older workers. 
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Detalled personnel procedures need to be in place - and actively implemented by 
managers - to stop the automatic 'binning' of appllcations from older people through-
out the process of recruitment to final appointment. For example, lf there are doubts 
about the health of older workers, lndlvldual medical examinations for all recruits can 
be used to check physical fitness. 
Changes in recruitment procedures also imply a change of attitude throughout the 
company, not just a pollcy imposed from the top. Studies in France, for example, have 
shown that chairmen and managing directors are sometimes wllling to accept older 
recruits, but their personnel managers fear potential problems and prefer not to risk 
changing their recruitment pollcles. 
2.2  Positive measures 
There are individual examples of employers who wllltngly recruit older staff, for exam-
ple the B&Q company in the UK. 
The UK Institute of Personnel Management has a Code of Practice to encourage recruit-
ment and employment of older workers
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• A 1991 UK survey
30 found that 33% of 
employers were raising maximum recruitment ages in order to promote employment of 
older staff. 
3  Consequences, conclusions and recommendations 
3.1  Consequences 
3.1.1  Access to employment 
• Access 1s denied on grounds of age for older workers ln all types of Jobs, ln both 
private and publlc sectors. Women returning to work can be particularly affected. 
3.1.2  Income 
• Reduced through lack of employment opportunities and enforced dependence 
on social benefits. 
3.1.3  Principle of  choice 
· The choice to work 1s effectively denied. 
3.2  Conclusions 
Employers discriminate both directly and indirectly, ln practice, against older workers ln 
recruitment. Their prejudice 1s both the most significant single factor stopping older 
workers from returning to work, and at the same time the most difficult to combat. 
Legislation by Itself ls not the answer. Employers' fundamental attitudes towards the 
value of older workers need to change. 
Measures to encourage recruitment of older staff need, nevertheless, to be accompanied 
or preceded by measures to discourage systematic early exit from the workforce. 
Legislation to stop the direct discrlmlnatlon of setting age llmlts in recruitment adver-
tisements could be an important symbollc signal from governments to employers about 
the need to change attitudes. Exemplary practice by governments in raising or abollsh-
lng age llmlts ln recruitment for national and European publlc sectors would set an 
example for private sector employers to follow. 
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Age discrimination in recruitment 
Direct discrlmlnatlon occurs where employers set speclfic age llmlts ln recruitment 
conditions. Indirect dtscrlmlnatlon where employers In practlce reject applications from 
older workers. 
Country  Dired  Cammon 
disalmlnatlan  features 
lndired  Cammon pradices 
B  YES 
OK  YES 
D  YES 
GR  YES 
E  YES 
F  NO 
IRL  YES 
l  YES 
Nl  YES 
p 
UK  YES 
Table C 
34 
Common to set age limits 
Common to set age limits 
1  ~20%  of adverts set limits 
40+% of skilled job adverts set 





43% of adverts set upper limit of 35  YES 
None in theory. legislation bans  YES 
Common to set age limits  YES 
(no information)  YES 
Common to set age limits  YES 
30-50% of adverts set age limits  YES 
of around 35 
Common to set age limits around 35  YES 




'Invisible' age limit age limits of 45-50 
Reluctance to recruit from 40 onwards 
'Invisible' age limit of 35/40 for both 
manual and skilled workers 
'Invisible' upper limit of 45 
'Invisible' age limits on older worker 
Reluctance to recruit older workers 
'Invisible' age limit of 45/50 
Reluctance to recruit over 50 
Reluctance to recruit older workers 
Reluctance to recruit older workers 
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3.3  Recommendations for action 
3.3.1  Age Umlts In recruitment adverUsements 
1) Binding legislation at national or European level should prohibit age llm1ts ln recruit-
ment advertisements, ln both private and publlc sectors. 
11)  National and European public sectors should establlsh exemplary practice by llftlng 
their own age llmlts ln recruitment. 
3.3.2  Discrimination In the recruitment process 
Measures to outlaw direct dlscrlmlnation should be supported by other actions to 
Influence the recruitment process as a whole: 
1) Persuasive actions with personnel organisations, employment agencies and consul-
tants and advertisers to ellm1nate age dlscrlmlnatlon throughout the recruitment 
process; 
11)  Creation at national and European level of 'good practice' networks of employers, 
personnel managers and trade unions ln recruitment of older staff. Dissemination of 
information from the networks vla employers' and trade union organisations. 
111)  Provision of financlallncenttves to employers for recruitment of older unemployed 
workers. 
Notes 
22. national report for Spain. 
23. national report for France. 
24. France prohibits the use of age llmlts In the private sector only. 
25. see Institute of Manpower Studies (1991), Study of Pald Employment: Labour Demand; 
Naylor, P (1987), In praise of older workers.  Personnel Management,  19, No 11,44-48: Jolly 1  et al 
(1098), Age as a factor In employment,  DE Research Papers 11 and 12. 
26. One rare example Is quoted ln The Netherlands of an advertisement for a lorry driver over 65. 
The employer gave two reasons: lower employer contributions and the tendency for older workers to be 
more readily available.  See national report for The Netherlands,  section 2.1.4. 
2  7.  Code du  travail, 311-4 . 
28. Greek national report,  section U.B.ll. 
29. Institute of Personnel Management,  1993. 
30. Institute of Manpower Studies (1991), Study of Paid Employment: Labour Demand. 
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Chapter 3 - The older unemployed: hidden and forgotten 
Older workers' unemployment is not In itself dlscrlmlnatlon. All ages and social groups 
are affected In the current recession. Dtscrtmtnation occurs where the older 
unemployed are treated differently from other age groups. Dlree forms have been 
identified, which contribute to making this older group the 'hidden and forgotten' 
unemployed. 
• direct dlscrtmlnation, by excluding older unemployed at a set age from: 
• employment promotion and other measures for unemployed; and 
• unemployment statistics. 
• indirect dlscrtmlnation by lack of targeted employment measures directed at 
older unemployed. 
The over-50s are over-represented among long-term unemployed In ahnost all EC coun-
tries and significant numbers remain unemployed for three years or more. For example, 
in Ireland In 1990, over 86% of unemployed aged 55 to 64 were long-term 
31 
unemployed and over 60% had been out of work for over 3 years  . 
Unemployment rates among older workers remain relatively low, however, due to the 
large numbers excluded from labour force statistics by early retirement or by specific 
measures affecting the older unemployed. This disguised unemployment has no doubt 
contributed to the lack of targeted measures to help older Jobseekers return to work. 
1 Direct discrimination: exclusion of the older unemployed 
1.1  Exclusion from employment promotion and other12 measures 
In three countries - Denmark, Greece and the Netherlands - upper age ltmtts, several 
years below official retirement age, are set for state measures to assist the unemployed. 
These constitute direct dlscrtmtnatton on grounds of age - and reflect the deltberate 
choice of governments to exclude older unemployed, as well as the assumption that 
older unemployed wtll not re-enter employment before retirement age. 
In Denmark, the upper age ltmtt for ellgibiltty for two schemes is 60 - seven years 
before official retirement age. Thts appltes both to start-up funds to assist self-employ-
ment and to the 'Job offer' scheme for the unemployed, where those over 60 have no 
rtghts to Job offers. 
In Greece, assistance for the unemployed to enter self-employment stops at SO - 15 
years before retirement age. 
State subsidies to employers for recruitment of long-term unemployed stop when the 
unemployed person reaches 57.5 years in the Netherlands, and 60 In Greeece-
between 5 and 7.5 years before retirement age. 
Older unemployed are also excluded from beneficial early retirement schemes In France 
and Denmark tf they are unfortunate enough to become unemployed too early. They 
. must then depend on lower social security benefits unttl retirement, once their unem-
ployment benefits run out. In France, tf workers become unemployed at or soon after 
50, they fall to qualtfy for the early retirement schemes offered at 55 by the unemploy-
ment fund.
33 In Denmark, workers becoming unemployed between 55 and 59 receive 
'transitional allowances' unttl retirement at 67; they fall to qualify for the financially 
advantageous early retirement scheme at 60. 
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1.2  Exclusion from unemployment statistics 
Government measures In several countries remove the older unemployed at 55 or later 
from unemployment statistics, by granting automatic benefits untU retirement age and 
exempting them from the need to register for work. Early and pre-retirement schemes, 
where workers pass directly from employment into early retirement, and lnvalldlty 
pensions are not Included ln the measures described below, although both also exclude 
older workers from labour force statistics. 
Automatic unemployment or related social benefits, or 'pre-retirement' allowances are 
paid to older unemployed at a certain age in the following countries: 
from age S  S: Belgium, Denmark, former East Germany, France, Ireland, 
the Netherlands
34 
from age 58: West Germany
35
; 
from age 60: the UK. 
In addition, early pensions are awarded to the unemployed at 60 in Spaln and Portugal. 
In most countries, except France
36 and Germany
37
,  the economic situation of the worker 
remains much the same as lf  he were registered unemployed; the only change is in hls 
status: excluded from statistics. 
These measures dlscrlmlnate against the older unemployed ln two key ways. 
First, by removing the older unemployed in large numbers from the register of unem-
ployed, the unemployment figures are kept artlficially low, although lt is impossible to 
quantify this exactly due to the lack of statistics avallable. For example, in former East 
Germany, over 1 mUllon unemployed workers have received pre-retirement allowances 
since 1989 and do not appear in unemployment figures. In Ireland, the 'Pre-Retirement 
Allowance Scheme' (PRETA) for the unemployed over 55 had an lmmedlate impact on 
long-term unemployment figures In the 45-64 age group from lts introduction in 1990. 
Whereas in 198  7 there were more long-term unemployed than retired in this age 
group, by 1990 thls was reversed and figures showed more retired than long- term 
unemployed31• 
Second, from the lnd.lvtdual's polnt of vlew, the removal of the need to register for work 
-up to 10 years before retirement age -indicates the hopelessness of obtaining further 
employment and actively discourages the older unemployed from seeking work. Where 
pre-retirement allowances are paid, for example In Belgium, Germany and France, the 
unemployed are speclfically prevented from taking other paid employment, or have 
strict llmlts on earned income. 
Some of these measures wete originally intended as protection for the older unemployed 
who had no chance of finding employment in the last years before retirement age; but 
in practice they have in certain countries, such as Belgium, Germany, France and the 
Netherlands, further encouraged companies to target older workers for redundancy at 
the set age knowing that these older unemployed wlll receive automatic cover untll 
retirement. 
The combined effect is to compound exclusion from the workforce of older workers. A 
reserve of 'hidden' unemployed between 55 and retirement age has been created, most 
of whom would prefer to be in work. Thelr removal from the unemployment register 
leaves them as 'non-status' workers: neither retired, nor unemployed. 
I 
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2 Indirect discrimination: lack of targeted employment measures 
There is dlscrlmlnatlon by omission in abnost all EC countries by the lack of measures 
designed to help older unemployed reenter the labour market. Thls contrasts with a 
battery of measures to help young Job-seekers. Dlsgutsed unemployment among the 
older age group no doubt contributes to the low priority accorded by governments to 
the older unemployed, particularly since unemployment rates among young workers are 
consistently high. 
No EC country except France has developed a programme of targeted employment 
measures for the older unemployed, although Germany and Spain each have one 
marginal scheme (see Positive measures). 
There are very few employment promotion schemes for the adult unemployed for whlch 
older workers are ellgtble. Those whlch exist are either open to all long-term 
unemployed over 2 5, or are specifically targeted on groups such as women returners, 
immigrants or disabled workers. None appear to cater adequately for the needs of older 
unemployed. 
The European Community's European Social Fund, whlch subsidises national Job-
creation initiatives, reflects the existing bias towards young workers by its heavy empha-
sis on funding for those under 2 5 and absence of any targeted funding for those over 40 
or 50. 
It is clear that many publlc authorities have made a dellberate choice. The former 
Belgian minister of employment, Luc Van den Brande, recognised this in 1990, stating, 
ln the context of restricting pre-retirement schemes: "  ...  when we put in place the arse-
nal of anti-unemployment measures, we made a choice between the young and the 
over-50s  ... now we must correct that choice and find solutions more appropriate to 
those in thelr 50s  ... "
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• 
The older unemployed in practice need more specific help to find alternative 
employment than other age groups. This is due to the difficulties in adapting to different 
Jobs or learning new skllls after 30 years in one type of employment, and to age-based 
preJudice against recruitment of older staff. The absence of targeted measures to assist 
thls group, compared with the provisions for other groups with special needs, therefore 
constitutes a double discrlmlnatlon against them. 
2.1  Positive measures 
In France, employers are exempt from soclal security contributions if they recruit unem-
ployed workers aged 50 or over. A slmllar scheme in Spain provides 50% reduction in 
social security contributions and an lnltlal subsidy to employers for recruitment of the 
long-term unemployed over 45
40
• In Germany subsidies of up to 75% of wage costs are 
paid for recruitment and employment of long-term unemployed over age 50. One 
Belgian employment promotion scheme
41 includes the unemployed over 50 as a target 
group. 
In France, state employment agencies provide special and personallsed assistance to 
help the older unemployed find new employment. Some individual employment agencies 
in Germany and the UK also glve attention to this group. 
\ 
38 Age discrimination against older workers in the European Community 
Older unemployed: hidden or forg.otten 
This table includes early and pre-retirement schemes which apply to unemployed workers who have already left 
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Exclusion from statistics (pre-retirement allowances) 
Exclusion from statistics ~ransitional allowances) 






58  Exclusion from statistics (automatic benefits if  choose  NO 
early pension) 
50/60  No further rights to assistance for self-employment/  YES 
subsidies for recruitment of long-term unemployed cease 
60  Exclusion from statistics (obligatory early pension)  NO 
55  Exclusion from statistics (pre-retirement allowances)  NO 
55  Exclusion from statistics (pre-retirement allowances)  YES 
............ 
But many discouraged unemployed do not register  YES 
and work in 'black' economy 
. .....  ..............  . .................. ..  ..  ..  . .  ..  ..  . 
55/57.5  Exclusion from statistics (pre-retirement allowances)  YES 
57.5  Subsidies for recruitment of long-term unemployed cease 
60  Exclusion from statistics (early pension)  YES 
60  Exclusion from statistics (automatic benefits)  YES 
Lack of spedal schemes 
1  scheme exists 
No specific scheme 
1 scheme exists 
No specific scheme 
1 scheme exists 
Several special schemes exist 
No specific scheme 
No specific scheme 
No specific scheme 
No specific scheme 
No specific scheme 
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3 Consequences. conclusions and recommendations 
3.1  Consequences 
3.1.1  Access to employment 
Access ts dented to the majority of older unemployed, slnce their llmtted chances of re-
entry tnto the labour market are further reduced by exclusion from employment promo-
tion measures, and by the absence of targeted measures to meet their special needs. The 
award of automatic benefits further discourages the older unemployed from actively 
seeklng work. 
3.1.2  Income 
Long-term unemployment, or alternative forms of low-patd, marginal jobs, leave older 
workers ln most countries on substantially reduced lncomes compared wtth thetr previ-
ous worklng wage. (see also Chapter 1: Severe loss oflncome.) 
3  .1. 3  Pr1nc1ple of  cho1ce 
The choice or right to work ts dented. Most older unemployed would prefer to be ln 
work, lf  only for financtal reasons. 
3.2  Conclusions 
Older unemployed workers are treated dtfferently from other age groups of unemployed. 
They receive hardly any assistance to reenter the labour market, in contrast to the 
many measures ln favour of the young unemployed, who also have htgh rates of long-
term unemployment. They are almost never targeted as a special needs group, unlike 
other groups of unemployed. 
The combined effect of the absence of targeted assistance, exclusion by age from some 
employment schemes, and removal from the unemployment statlstlcs, makes them a 
'forgotten' group among the unemployed. Many are condemned to long-term 
unemployment for 5 to 10 years or more untll retirement age. 
3.3  Recommendations 
3.3.1  Ass1stance for older unemployed 
i) Age llmlts excludtng the older unemployed from employment promotion measures or 
other assistance should be outlawed. 
tt) New Job-creation measures likely to be developed ln the recession should spectfically 
tnclude older workers and publlc authorities should provide some targeted assistance for 
all unemployed over 50. This could tnclude: 
• financialtncentlves for job-creation for or recruitment of the over-50s up to 
retirement age 
·special measures by state employment agencies to assist older job-seekers find 
work and to encourage employers to consider older applicants. 
ttl) The EC European Social Fund should make older unemployed one of its target 
groups for fundtng of job-creation measures. 
tv) A European network of employment agencies (state and private sector) which 
speclaltse ln or cater spectfically for older unemployed Job-seekers should be created to 
dtssemlnate good practice in assisting the older unemployed. 
3.3.2  Exclus1on from unemployment statistics 
l) The older unemployed receiving automatic benefits should not be removed from 
unemployment statistics, unless they are ln a formal early retirement scheme. 
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11) Eurostat should require EC countries to collect and publish figures of older 
unemployed recelvlng automatic benefits ln order to help assess real unemployment 
levels among older workers. 
Notes 
31. Source adapted from Ronayne and Duggan (1993). 
32. Exclusion from  training Is discussed separately In Chapter 4. 
33. Financial penlllUes are now Imposed on companies making workers redundant at 50, with the 
aim of discouraging early redundancies. See Part 2. 
34. for unemployed  aged 55 as a result of collecUve redundancies: for other unemployed. from 57.5. 
35. If the unemployed worker, after one year's unemployment, chooses to claim an early state 
pension at 60. 
36. The pre-reUrement allowances are more generous than long-term unemployment benefits. 
37. The early state pension at 60 Is higher than long-term unemployment benefits. 
38. see Irish report, section U 
39. "  ..• quand on a mls en place l'arsenlll anU-chomage,  on a fait un cholx entre les Jeunes et ceux qui 
avalent plus de clnquante ans (  ..• ). Aujourd'hul  ... ll faut corrlger ce cholx et trouver des solutions qul 
convlennent aux clnquantenlllres". Belgian report,  secUon C.2. 
40. Royal Decree 3239/83 of 28/12/83, amended by Law 22192 of 3017/92. 
41. Arrete Royal of 2102/89. 
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Chapter 4 - Exclusion from training 
Two types of training are considered In this chapter: 
• government schemes for the unemployed 
• and employers' provision of In-service training. 
Direct dlscrtmlnation occurs where older people (below retirement age) are excluded 
from training schemes on grounds of age; this applles mainly to government 
programmes for the unemployed. The impact of Indirect discrlmlnation ls more 
significant, however, ln discouraging older workers from participating in training 
throughout their working lives. Self-discrimination may also prevent older workers do 
not take up training opportunities. 
Older workers, from 40 onwards, appear to be significantly under-represented ln both 
types of training ln all countries. However, the lack of age-based statistics and system-
atic Information In this field excludes a full analysts of participation rates, or of the 
reasons for under-representation
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• The comments below are based on indications given 
by the national correspondents from small-scale national studies or their own knowl-
edge. There ls a need for more systematic information in thls field. 
Since training at work tends to be targeted on better quallfied personnel, age factors for 
today's generation of older workers are compounded by their lack of initial education 
and vocational qual1fications. Lack of training at work means older workers are more 
llkely to fall behind In terms of new work methods and use of new technologies. Thls In 
turn discourages employers from keeping or recrultlng them.  Once unemployed, their 
outdated skills are an obstacle to re-entering working llfe, but age and educational 
factors often exclude them from re-training. 
The cost of non-training Is potentially high in terms of reduced productivity and costs 
of redundancies for older staff and retraining of others. For governments, the cost of 
unemployment benefits and rising long-term unemployment is no doubt more expen-
sive than provision of targeted training courses resulting in jobs for the older 
unemployed. 
1 Direct discrimination: maximum age limits for training schemes 
1.1  Public sector training for the unemployed 
Older workers who become unemployed, often after leaving traditlonalindustrles ln 
decllne, need to update their skills In order to improve their chances of re-employment. 
This group of unemployed is probably the most In need of specific training or re-train-
Ing. 
Yet direct dlscrlmlnation ls evident In six countries in excluding the older unemployed 
from training above a certain age. Where eliglbillty stops at retirement age, thls has not 
been defined as age discrimination. 
Direct discrlmlnation has been Identified In two stages: 
1.1.1  Total exduslon above a set age 
In four countries-Denmark, Greece, Italy and the UK- upper age llmlts, below retire-
ment age, exclude the older unemployed from any training schemes. 
In Greece, an upper age of 4 6 is applied - 19 years before retirement age - beyond 
which there is no access to state training programmes. 
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In Denmark, the unemployed over 50 - 17 years before retirement age - have no rights 
to training or education provision. 
In Italy, there are no provisions for any government training of unemployed people aged 
over 29. 
In the UK, government training programmes officially set age 60 as the upper llmlt - 5 
years before the male retirement age. However, no priority for places is given to those 
over 50, which in practice excludes most unemployed from that age -10  to 15 years 
before retirement age. 
1.1.2  Exclusion by age from  the large majority of measures 
In two other countries, Spain and Ireland, upper age llmlts of less than 30 apply to the 
great majority of training schemes, targeted at the young unemployed. The number of 
schemes which are theoretically open to the older unemployed ls so small as to be 
insignificant. Such schemes are usually targeted at other special needs groups, such as 
women or disabled workers. 
In Ireland, 70% or more participants in skllls training are under 25; whereas Just over 
1% are aged 55-64. In Spain, there is just one general scheme open to adult long-term 
unemployed. Agerelated statistics avaUable for students who were positively evaluated 
after training show that just over 1% were over 55. 
The older male unemployed suffer more than women from age-based exclusion, since 
some tralnlng measures are targeted at women returning to work. 
1.2  Employers' provision of training at work 
No direct dlscrlminatlon has been tdentlfied from extstlng information. Companies do 
not appear to set official age targets for their tralning provisions. 
In Belgium a former age llmlt of 40 for ellgibllity for paid tralning or educational leave 
was removed in 198543,  but to date only 9% of those uslng this scheme were over 40. 
It ls worth noting that even ln the USA, where antl-age dlscrlmlnatlon legislation 
protects older workers in most training provisions, employers and trade unions may 
legally exclude workers over 40 from apprenticeship tralnlng44. 
2 Indirect discrimination: lack of specific training measures 
Indirect dtscrlmlnation ls apparent ln all EC countries by the absence of specific trainlng 
measures adapted to the needs of older workers or the older unemployed. 
Training material tends to be pedagogically designed for young participants, who have 
only recently finished schoollng, whereas older workers wlth over 20 years' work expe-
rience behind them need a different approach. Thls applles ln both publlc and private 
sector tralnlng schemes. 
There also appear to be high levels of self-dlscrlminatlon by older workers wlth regard 
to tralnlng opportunities, both at work and in unemployment. They apparently accept 
stereotypical attitudes that they are 'too old' to learn new skllls later ln llfe and their 
lnitiallack of education to creases their reluctance to 'return to school'. 
2.1  Public sector training for the unemployed 
No training scheme has been reported which speclfically addresses the needs of the 
older unemployed. It appears that the emphasis on government training for the young 
unemployed is at the direct expense of trainlng opportunities for older age groups. 
The EC's European Social Fund has been critlclsed, especially by correspondents in 
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Exclusion from training 
Direct dlscrtmlnatton has been identified only In government schemes setting an upper age llmlt 
excluding the older unemployed. Indirect dlscrtmlnatlon occurs ln both government and 
company tralnlng schemes through under-representation of older workers. 
Country  Direct  Age  Government schemes 
disaim. 
B  NO 
OK  YES 
0  NO 
GR  YES 
E  YES 
F  NO 
IRL  YES 
YES 
Nl  NO 
p  NO 






Excluded from training schemes 
In theory no age limit 
Excluded from training schemes 
Almost all schemes are for under 
30s. 1% of evaluated students 55+. 
(positive measures) 
Vast majority of schemes are for 
under-25s. 1% of participants 55+ 
No training for unemployed over 29 
50/60  Training schemes exclude o'Jef' 60's 
















Government or company schemes 
Under-representation in government and 
company schemes. 
Under-representation in company schemes 
In practice, unemployed over 60 are not 
accepted for government training 
Under-representation from 40+ in company 
schemes 
Under-representation in company schemes 
Under-representation in company schemes 
Under-represention in government and 
company schemes· 
Under-representation in company training 
Under-representation in company training 
Under-representation in government and 
company schemes. 
Under-representation in government and 
company schemes 
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southern Europe, for its over-emphasis on subsidies for training of unemployed aged 
under 25. The proportion of funding avallable for the 'long-term un-employed over 25' 
is much smaller and this has negatively affected government schemes for adult unem-




Where the older unemployed do participate in general training programmes, the effec-
tiveness can be reduced by their unsuitable teaching methods. In Greece, for example, 
90% of redundant workers leaving industries in crisis, mainly aged over 45, chose to 
participate in training when age llmits were exceptionally waived for this group. But it 
proved ineffective in helping this age group to find new jobs, because the training had 
been designed for younger workers. 
Many older unemployed, discouraged in various ways front trying to re-enter the labour 
market, suffer from a lack of motivation. Studies in France have shown that they find it 
dlfficult to accept the concept of re-training and would only accept if they felt it would 
guarantee another job. 
There is therefore a need both for targeted training measures and for social and peda-
gogical support for those who undertake retraining. In Germany this need for support 
during the training period has been recognised and is one of two conditions laid down 
for older unemployed who participate in government training. The second condition, 
significantly, is that there must be the prospect of another job after training. 
2.2  Employers' provision of in-service training 
Participation in training at work appears to decrease sharply after 40 or 45 according 
to the national studies which have been undertaken. For example, in Germany, studies 
of participation in company training show a sharp fall for workers over 40, compared 
to those aged 35 to 39; and after 50 only a tiny minority participate. 
Several countries reported emphasis of gender inequallties with age, usually in favour of 
men. In France and Germany, for example, older men were more llkely to receive train-
ing than older women -in Germany over 3.5 times more men than women are in 
training after 40. Yet in the UK, over 2.5 times more women than men received train-
ing at work in the five years before pensionable age (60 for women; 65 for men). 
Within companies, the marked decline in participation after 40 can be at least partly 
attributed to self-dlscriminatlon by older workers and studies confirm this. In Denmark, 
a survey of 50-54 year olds, mainly in active employment, found only 25% wishing to 
receive further training. In the UK,  a 1989 study4
6 found that among workers aged 35-
59, 53% of women and 44% of men could not envisage having any klnd of training. In 
Germany, appllcatlons for training leave from employers are made almost entirely by 
workers under 40. 
Employers' personnel pollcies do not priorltlse training older staff. Employers also quote 
economic reasons for the lack of training provisions: older workers are too expensive to 
train because of their high salaries and the short period of return for the company after 
the training investment. 
These economic arguments may be refuted by the reduced mobtltty of older staff, so 
decreasing the risk of them leaving after training, and the increasing need for regular 
re-training of all workers in new technologies, whereby training to last for a 5year 
period is just as valld for workers of 50 as for younger staff. Dutch studies
47 have also 
shown the effectiveness of training older workers, and revealed that their productivity 
increases four times as much after training as by income incentives. 
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2.2.1  Pos1t1ve measures 
Indtvtdual company examples can be found and some are described ln Part II. A 
German trade union, IG-Metall, has negotiated specific tralnlng rights for older workers. 
In France special ald ls given for company tralnlng of workers over 45. 
No systematic trends were identified by national reports, but a recent survey of 30 large 
companies ln five EC countries by CEDEFOP, the European Centre for the Development 
of Vocational Tralnlng, showed a large majority of these companies adopting more posi-
tive attitudes towards tralnlng of older staff. Another, larger study ln nlne Member 
States ls currently under war•. 
The need for contlnulng tralnlng at work has been recognised by the European 




The current reform of the EC European Social Fund proposes a new emphasis on ongo-
ing tralnlng at work to prevent loss of employment. 
3 Consequences, conclusions and recommendations 
3.1  Consequences 
3.1.1  Access to employment 
Lack of access to tralnlng at work results ln outdated skills and the rlsk of loss of 
employment. Once unemployed, lack of re-tralnlng mlnlmlses the chance of finding 
another job. 
3.1.2  Income 
Lack of tralnlng reduces earnlng potential at work, and may result ln unemployment 
and significant income loss. 
3.1.3  Pr1nc1ple of  mo1ce 
Freedom to choose a new career or to learn new skllls ls restricted by lack of access to 
tralnlng. Self-dlscrtmlnatlon reflects the lndlvldual's perception of hls own lack of 
choice. 
3.2  Conclusions 
Older workers are excluded from tralnlng opportunities both at work and as 
unemployed job-seekers from 40 onwards. Where opportunities do exist, there are no 
specific provisions to meet the needs of older age-groups and effectiveness ls therefore 
reduced. 
Yet lf  older workers are to remain productive, motivated and flexible they will need 
contlnulng tralnlng untll the end of career. Thls wlll no doubt be a key factor ln assist-
log older people to remain in work. 
There ls therefore an urgent need to target today's workers of 35 and over for ongoing 
training at work ln order to improve their long-term job prospects and flexlblllty of 
employment ln later llfe. 
3.3  Recommendations for action 
3.3.1  Publ1c sector tra1n1ng for the unemployed 
l) Upper age llmlts on training schemes for the adult unemployed should be abolished. 
Age-based crlterla for priority in awardlng places should also be removed. 
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11)  All older unemployed workers should have access to some public sector training 
provtslon. 
lll) Specific, targeted schemes should be designed for retralnlng of workers over 45, wlth 
teaching methods adapted to thelr needs and individual support for participants. 
3.3.2  Employers' provision of  In-service training 
l) Financial incentives should be provided to companies for continuing training of work-
ers over 40 untll the end of thelr career. 
11) Public authorities or state employment agencies should advise companies, especially 
SMEs, on the need for skills updating and best methods to use wlth older workers. 
lll) Employers and trade unions should ensure that older workers are specifically 
included in tralnlng and further education provlslon. 
lv) Older workers should be informed of and encouraged to take up training opportuni-
ties. Thls should be a combined responsibility of public authorities and employers. 
Notes 
42. See also ILO study 1990. 
43. Law of 22101185: Royal Decree of 23/07/85. 
44. See Part 2, Chapter 2. 
45. The European Social Fund Is now under review and the new proposals reduce the emphasis on 
young unemployed under 25. while Increasing measures to assist long-term unemployed In general. 
However,  there Is still no proposed targeting of older groups of unemployed. 
46. 'Training for Britain (1989)'. 
47. A. Gelderblom and]. de Koning (1992). 
48. Reday-Mulvey, Genevieve (1993). 
49. Council  Decision  of 29th  May 1990:  Development of Continuing training.  EC 'FORCE' 
programme for conUnulng training. 
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Chapter 5 - Retirement age 
Thls sector examines the posltlon for those who are still working at retirement age. The 
lmposltlon of a speclfic age for retirement constitutes age dlscrlmlnation, slnce lt dentes 
free choice for those who wish or need to continue working. 
Direct dlscrlmlnation occurs where the standard retirement age ls used as a ltmlt 
beyond which lt ls either Impossible or financially unattractive to work, or at whlch 
workers' rtghts or benefits are removed for those continuing ln work. Indirect dlscrlml-
nation ls evident ln the obllgation to work longer Imposed by ralslng retirement ages, 
and the lack of partial retirement options avallable. 
However, retirement ages are Increasingly Irrelevant as an Indicator of an end to work-
lng llfe.  75% of those reaching retirement age ln the EC are already retired or Inactive.  5° 
The dlscrlmlnatory measures analysed below therefore apply to a small mlnorlty of 
today's older workers. 
All EC governments agreed ln 1982 that flextble retirement ls their common goal
51
, 
wlth flexlblllty ln upwards as well as downwards directions. However, to date ltttle 
progress has been made ln providing real flexlblllty of chotec for workers. 
1:  Direct discrimination: loss of employment rights at 
retirement age 
1.1  Loss of employment protection or mandatory retirement at the 
standard age 
Workers can be obllged to leave work at retirement age by the loss of statutory protec-
tion against dlsmlssal or by mandatory retirement clauses ln employment contracts. 
Both measures are dlscrlmlnatory ln uslng age as the sole factor, wlthout regard for the 
lndlvldual's ablllty or wish to continue work. 
1.1.1  Loss of  protection agalnst dlsmlssal 
Statutory provlslons allow employers to dlsmlss employees at or after retirement age ln 
Greece, Italy and the UK 52 on grounds of age. In France, employers may obltge workers 
to take retirement at 60-the 'mlse a  Ia retralte'- but have to make a speclal 
retirement payment; thls ls thus legally separate from dlsmlssal. although 1t has an 
almost identical effect. 
In Greece, France and Italy these dlsmlssals, or the French 'mlse a Ia retralte', are 
permttted only on condltlon that the worker ls ellgible for a full old age pension under 
the contributory pension system. If  the contribution record ls lnsufficlent, the worker's 
employment protection remalns. Both France and Italy have anomalous legal provlslons 
which, on the one hand, specifically provlde for continued protection of workers' rlghts 
beyond retirement age, yet on the other hand allow ellglbillty for a pension to under-
mlne the protection agalnst dismlssal. 
It has been noted that, at least in France, the protection of full pension rights does not 
work ln practice since employers can legally make a 60-year old worker redundant, 
whether or not he qualifies for a full pension. Although the redundancy payment ls 
higher than for retirement, the worker ls nevertheless obllged to retire on a reduced 
pension. 
In the Netherlands, agreements ln some Industry sectors, such as hotel and catering or 
meat-products, speclfically provide for easter dlsmlssal of workers over 65. 
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1.1.2  Mandatory retirement 
Mandatory retirement, usually at the statutory retirement age, ls widely used in 
employment contracts and collective agreements to Impose an automatic termination of 
the work contract. There are notable exceptions in France, Germany and Greece, where 
such agreements are restricted (see below). Mandatory retirement ls also common in 
the public sector. 
In Spaln, mandatory retirement was specifically prohibited untll the 1980s, when 
amendments to labour legtslatlon
53 allowed a maximum working age to be set, either by 
government or by collective agreement, in order to release jobs for the unemployed. 
In The Netherlands the upper age llmlts of 65 has been legally challenged, on grounds 
of age dlscrlmlnatlon, but without success
54
• The Courts ruled that an upper age55  was 
justified to allow employment opportunities for younger workers. 
The abolltion of mandatory retirement does not mean that all workers will wish to 
continue working after retirement age. In the USA, for example, where workers have 
full employment protection at any age,  75% of workers retire at the earllest possible 
date. 
1.1. 3  Positive measures 
In France and Germany employment contracts containing mandatory retirement 
clauses have been prohibited. In Greece, collective agreements are not allowed to cover 
pension schemes and usually do not set an age for automatic termination of the work 
contract. 
1.2  Loss of workers' rights 
The loss of workers' rights and benefits, including the right to take paid employment, 
after retirement age, constitutes another form of direct dlscrtminatlon. 
1.2.1  No combinaUon of  earnings with pension 
In Spain, the pension ls suspended as soon as any paid work ls undertaken. However, 
contributions pald from such work do increase the final pension paid. 
In Greece the former generous earnings allowance for working pensioners has been 
removed for those entering the pension insurance system after January 19935'. Their 
pension will be automatically reduced by one-third as soon as they start any paid work. 
Three other countries-Belgium, Denmark
57
,  and Italy- set an earnings ceiling above 
which pensions may be reduced or suspended. 
1.2.2  Rights and benefits 
The Netherlands reports various examples of loss of workers' rights and benefits, which 
are not apparent in other countries. 
The mlnlmum wage does not apply to workers over 65. As a result, some industry 
sectors, for example steel, bakeries and shoe manufacturing, pay workers over 65 lower 
wages. In certain industries, other negotiated rights are lost or reduced at 65, such as 
slck pay entitlement, time off through senlorlty, and longer periods of notice before 
dismissal. 
Dutch law also removes fiscal allowances for self-employed people after retirement age, 
preventing the offsetting of business losses against tax. The Dutch courts have 
dismissed legal challenges on the grounds that those over 6 5 have no need to work, 
since they receive the basic pension, and that they need less income for savings, so can 
afford higher taxes
51l 
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Retirement age 
Direct dlscrlmlnatlon occurs where either the state or employers use theretirement age 
as a llmlt beyond which lt ls not possible to work, or at which for those working certain 
rights are lost. Indirect dlscrtmlnation is evident ln ralslng of retirement ages and lack of 
partial retirement options. 
Country  Dired  Loss of workers' rights or 
disaimination  mandatory retirement 
lndired  Lack of partial retirement/ 
disaimination  higher retirement ages 
8  YES  Mandatory retirement by collective agreement  NO  (positive measures) 
···················· ··························· ........................................................................................................ ································································· 
OK  YES  Mandatory retirement. loss of some workers' 
rights by collective agreement 
NO  (positive measures) 
••••••••••••••••••••  ••••••••••••••  ••••••••••• ·····-··  ••  ••••••••••••••••••••  ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••  0  ...................................... ·····-··-····· •••••• 
D  NO  (positive measures)  YES 
NO 
Raised retirement age imposes longer 
'NOrking life or reduced pensions 
(positive measures) 
···················· ..... ··········· ........... ····· .................................. ··························· ··························· ······································· ..................... . 
GR  NO 
YES 
Collective agreements may not set pension 
schemes and do not usually impose mandatory 
retirement 




Raised retirement ages imposes longer 
working life for women and/or reduced 
pensions 
Lack of partial retirement options 
........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 
E  YES 
F  NO 
YES 
IRL  YES 
YES 
Mandatory retirement by collective agreement 
Mandatory retirement by collective agreement 
prohibited 
Loss of protection against dismissal at 
pensionable age 
Mandatory retirement under some 
collective agreements 












Raised retirement age does not increase 













Loss of protection against dismissal at 
pensionable age 
YES 
Mandatory retirement under collective agreements  YES 
Loss of various workers' rights, 
eg. minimum wage, tax allowances 
Mandatory retirement under collective agreements  YES 
Mandatory retirement under collective agreements  YES 
Loss of protection against dismissal after retirement  YES 
age 
lack of partial retirement options 
lack of partial retirement options 
lack of partial retirement options 
Proposed longer working life for 
women's pension 
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1.3  Positive measures 
In the UK and Ireland tax allowances are increased for working pensioners, as a form 
of positive dlscrlminatlon and UK workers above retirement age are exempt from 
employees' contrtbuttons. 
Since the EC Recommendation on flexible retirement of 198259,  some countries, includ-
ing France and the UK, have relaxed previous restrictions on combining earnings wlth 
a pension. 
2 Indirect discrimination 
2.1  Raising retirement ages 
The emerging trend towards raising retirement ages and extending the working ltfe, in 
response to pension financing problems, risks increasing dlscrlmlnatlon against older 
workers in two ways. 
Ftrst, raising the state pensionable age, without reversing the early exit culture and 
increasing work opportunities, will increase the gap between early loss of employment 
from 50 or 55 and official retirement age. The older unemployed will suffer most 
through longer periods of unemployment. 
Second, an obllgatlon to work longer in order to earn the same pension income, partic-
ularly for women, ls contained in most pension reforms implemented or under consid-
eration. Retirement earller than the new official ages will almost always attract 
financial penalties. 
Germany, Greece and Italy have already implemented pension reforms; France and the 
UK are debating proposed measures. 
In Germany, the retirement reforms passed in 1992
60 impose a longer working llfe by 
abollshing the optlon of a full early pension at 60 for women and the unemployed and 
at 63 for men. The reforms will raise the 'real' retirement age, in steps, to 65 by early 
next century. Early retirement will in future be possible up to three years in advance, 
imposing pension reductions of up to 10.8%. The unemployed are likely to suffer most 
from these measures. 
The remaining optlon of a full early pension at 60 for disabled German workers may 
also be restricted in future. 
In Greece, pension reforms
61 wlll establlsh equal retirement ages for men and women at 
65 in the private sector for those insured after 1st January 1993. Women insured after 
thls date wlll have to work 5 years longer before clalmlng a pension. Workers in the 
public sector, and particularly women, are also affected by the reforms which lmpose a 
longer working llfe and pension reductions. 
In Italy the official retirement age will be raised to 60 for women and 65 for men over 
the next decade, and in practice these wlll become the official ages from 1994. 
However, there is no obllgatory extension of the working llfe to qualtfy for the baste 
state pension: workers still become ellgible after 3 5 years of contributions. 
In France proposals under discussion would increase the contributory perlod for a full 
pension from 3 7.5 to 40 years, without changing the retirement age of 60. These 
lncreased contrtbutlon periods would particularly affect pension tncome for women 
with interrupted work careers. 
In the UK, the equaltsatlon of retirement ages for men and women (65 and 60 respec-
tively) ls under debate. Proposals tnclude ralslng the retirement age for women to 65 
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which would impose five extra years' work before eltgiblllty for the state pension. 
In all cases, except Italy, women workers wtll suffer most from the obltgatton to work 
longer for pension entitlement. 
2.2  Lack of partial retirement options 
Despite an agreement at EC level to promote phased retirement
62
,  governments have 
introduced very few schemes. Those which have been set up to allow transitional retire-
ment before the official age, are sometimes poorly designed and have fatled to attract 
stgnlficant numbers of parttctpants. 
In France the part-time early retirement scheme provides no financtalincentlve to 
workers: they gain only 10% in income, compared wtth full early retirement. The 
scheme has attracted only minimal support as a result. In Denmark, Germany and 
Italy, the partial retirement schemes are only avatlable by negottatton with the 
employer for terms; they are not an automatic rtght llke full-time early retirement in 
Denmark or Germany. Since trade untons have been opposed to partial employment, 
there has been llttle take-up so far. 
As long as phased retirement schemes are presented as second-best options, workers 
wtll not be encouraged to accept them. In addttton, companies have not been prepared 
to make arrangements to allow part-time work for those approaching retirement63 and 
this has discouraged participation in government schemes. 
2.3  Positive measures 
The combtnatton of earnings wtth pensions in almost all EC countries has allowed the 
possibillty of part-time working after retirement age. Some governments, such as 
Denmark and France, have specific schemes whtch allow part-time employment to be 
combined wtth a proportion of the full pension. Others, such as the UK and Germany, 
allow pensions to be deferred while working past retirement age and incremental 
increases to be patd when they are finally claimed. 
Belgtum has introduced some flextbtltty of retirement between 60 and 65. 
3  Consequences, conclusions and recommendations 
3.1  Consequences 
3.1.1  Access to employment: Is dented solely on grounds of age under mandatory retirement 
or loss of employment protection at retirement age. 
3.1.2  Income 
• Enforced transfer to a pension usually reduces total income and many workers need to 
continue work for financial reasons. 
• Loss of rtghts to a mtnlmum wage results in lower wages for working pensioners 
in the Netherlands. 
• Pension reforms wtll mean reduced pensions for the same number of working years. 
3.1.3  Prlnclple of dzolce 
Chotce of retirement age ts dented, both through mandatory retirement or dtsmtssal at 
retirement age, and through retirement measures which obllge workers to continue 
working longer in order to earn the same penston. 
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3.2  Conclusions 
EC governments have made no significant moves to increase workers' choice of retire-
ment; their pollcies continue to impose a set age for retirement. The new trend towards 
raising retirement ages wlllinevttably increase problems of age dlscrlminatlon, as the 
gap between early loss of employment in the 50s and official retirement age increases to 
10 or 15 years. 
Flexible retirement - either within a period of years, or above or below a set age - ls the 
non-discriminatory alternative to existing retirement pollctes, provided the choice of 
retirement age remains financially neutral. This allows tndtvldual factors to be taken 
into account for those wishing to work longer, such as personal financial obllgatlons, 
the need to complete pension contributions or the dependence on work for social 
contact for those llvlng alone. 
3.3  Recommendations 
t) Workers should be allowed the principle of free choice in their retirement age. The 
proposals on flexible retirement in the 1982 EC Recommendation should be 
implemented. 
ll) The official retirement age should not be used as a mandatory retirement age against 
a worker's wlll. 
ttl) Those who continue working after retirement age should have the same workers' 
rights as other workers. In particular, they should not receive less pay for the sam 
work. 
Notes 
50. Source: Eurostat. 
51. EC Recommendation 1982. 
52. Employment protection remalns for women until 65, despite the current differences In pensionable 
age,  due to EC provisions on equal treatment for men and women under Article 119 of the EC Treaty. 
53. Fifth Amendment of Law 8/1980 of the Workers' Statute and Ruling 2211981 of 217/81 of the 
Constitutional Tribunal. 
54. The case of unlverslty law professor H.  van Maarseveen: Ambtenarengerecht Rotterdam,  13/4/92, 
AW 1991/597. 314/92, AW 1991/597. 
56. Law 2084/92. 
57. The old age pension Is regulated/rom 67-69;  from  70 onwards, only the small supplement Is 
regulated. 
58. HR 6/6/90, BNB 1990, 212. 
59. EC Council Recommendation of 10 December 1982 on the principles of Community pollcy with 
regard to retirement age. 
60. Pension Reform Act (Rentenreformgesetz) of 1992. 
61. Laws 1902/90, 1976191 and 2084/92. 
62. 1982 EC Recommendation. 
63. The exception ln Europe as a whole ls ln Sweden.  where companies have adapted to older workers' 
needs for part-time work to overcome labour shortages. 
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54 Part 2 
Positive measures to combat age 
discrimination: Europe and the 
United States 
This section summarises the positive measures which exist In  EC countries to assist or protect 
older workers.  It then examines the scope and Impact of the anti-age dlscrimlnatlon legislation 
in the USA. Age discrimination against older workers in the European Community 
Chapter 6 - Positive measures in Europe 
Positive measures at nattonallevel have been briefly mentioned 1n Part One. They are 
described more fully tn thts section to provide an overview of exlstlng constitutional 
protection and statutory measures which could help to combat age dtscrtmtnatton. 
Some examples of extsttng good practice by employers and trade unions are also htgh-
lighted. 
The special benefits and privtleges awarded to older workers under collective 
agreements or other provisions are not covered here. These typically tnclude seniority 
prlnctple ln wage scales; earntngs protection 1n the event of job transfer or downgrad-
tng; favourable conditions for worktng hours, ttme off, night working, etc. Although 
they benefit those tn work, their overall effect does not combat age dtscrtmtnatton, slnce 
they tend to tncrease employers' reluctance to recruit older jobseekers. 
1 Constitutional protection for older workers 
1.1.  Several countries make direct or tndtrect reference to the protection of older work-
ers' rights ln their Constitution or ln baste labour laws. In practice, such provisions 
have not prevented dtscrtmtnation agalnst older workers ln employment. However, they 
could provide a legal basts for future statutory actions by national authorities. 
1.1.1  Spain 
Spanish labour law provides the most specific protection tn the EC against dtscrtmtna-
tton on grounds of age: 
A law of 1980
64 states that: "workers have the right not to be dtscrtmtnated against tn 
their appltcatlon for employment or once employed on grounds of sex, marital status or 
age, wtthtn the Umtts set out tn thts Law, ... ". 
Another artlcle
65 ls even more spectfic: "any regulations, clauses of collective 
agreements, tndtvidual agreements or untlateral decisions of employers which contatn 
an element of dtscrtmtnatton on grounds of age wtll be considered null and void ... ". 
In addttton, the Spanish Constitution (1978) includes an openly phrased antl-dtscrtmi-
natlon clause, from whtch age can be directly tnferred: "none shall suffer any dtscrtmt-
natlon whatsoever on grounds of btrth, ... or any other personal or social condition or 
circumstance". It also tncludes the prlnclple of the right to work. 
1.1.2  Italy 
The Italtan Constitution specifically allows for an tndivtdual's choice to work and tnfers 
no dtscrtmlnatton based on age: "the duty of every cltlzen to take part tn some activity, 
according to thetr own potential and choice, that contributes to the material progress of 
society". It recognises the right to work for all and calls for legislation to "promote the 
conditions for the exercise of that right". 
These provlslons led the Constitutional Court to rule that workers over 65: "should 
enjoy the same rights accorded to other workers"66• 
1.1.3  Germany 
There new Constitution of untfied Germany does not tnclude the right to work principle 
which existed ln the former GDR's Constitution. 
Labour law on workers' cooperative rlghts
67 spectfically provides that workers' commit-
tees must ensure "that workers are not disadvantaged because they have passed certain 
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Positive measures helping to combat age discrimination in EC countries 
The measures summarised below all target older workers specifically. 
Country  1 Constitutional protection 
B 
DK 
D  Labour law mentions OW 
2 Protection against 
redundancy/dismissal 
Special protection under many 
collective agreements 
GR  Equality &  right work in constitution.  Case law protects  in principle 
Protection via jurisprudence 
E 
F 
Direct protection against age 
discrimination in Workers' Statute. 
Open discrimination clause in 
constitution 
Right to work established 
Labour law prohibits age 
discrimination 
Law and financial penalties 
discourage redundancies for 50+ 
3 Employment/reauitrnent incentives 
Unemployed 50+ targetted in one 
employment scheme. 
Limited scheme pays 75% wage subsidy 
for <8 years for unemployed 50+ 
50% social security reductions & initial 
subsidy for unemployed 45+ 
1  00% social security exemption for <1 0 
years for unemployed aged 50+. 
Priority to 50+ in employment 
Measures and help for job-seekers 
IRL  Draft law will set age as criterion for  -
unfair dismissal 50+ 
Rights & choice to work in consti-
tution. Protection via jurisprudence 
Case law sets age as criterion for 
unfair dismissal 
NL  Open discrimination clause in consti- Redundancy schemes targeting 
tution. Protection via jurisprudence  workers 55+ prohibited 
P  Open discrimination clause in consti- Redundancy criteria give some 
tu~on. Right to work  protection 
UK 
Table G 
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Positive measures helping to combat age discrimination in EC countries 
The measures summarised below all target older workers specifically. 
Country  4 Training or other measures  5 Age limits In reauitment  6 Mandatory retirement  7 Partial  retirement options 
B 
DK 
D  Some trade union training 
provisions 
Prohibited in work 
contracts from 1992 
GR  Pensionable age 





Subsidies for employer 
training of workers 45+ 
and for 'tutorage' schemes. 
Government working group 
&  research centre 
Law prohibits in private 
sector job adverts 
NL  Legislation to prohibit under 
discussion 
p 
UK  Government working group 




Use of age limits actively 
discouraged 
Prohibited in work 
contracts 
Flexible retirement between 
60 &  65 but women are 
disadvantaged 
Part-time retirement option 
before and after pensionable 
age 
New partial retirement options 
Part-time retirement option 
Part-time retirement options Age discrimination against older workers in the European Community 




1.1.4  The Netherlands 
The Constitution includes an openly phrased 'non-discrtmtnation' clause: discrtmtnation 
is forbidden on specific grounds and also for "any other reason". Dutch courts have 
interpreted this as lncludlng age dlscrlmlnation ln certain cases
69
,  but other legal chal-
lenges of age dlscrlmlnation have fatled. 
1.1.6  Greece 
The Constitution establlshes the principles of equallty, social justice and human dlgnlty70 
and provides for the right to work
71
• This legal framework led the courts to outlaw the 
setting of an age llmtt for obllgatory exit from work. 
1.1. 7  Portugal 
The Constitution states that no-one shall be dlscrlmlnated against or deprived of rights 
on grounds of"  ... economic situation or social condition". It also establishes the princi-
ple of the right to work. 
1.1.8  France 
The French constitution provides for a general right to work. Although France has 
taken the most comprehensive initiatives in Europe to promote older workers' employ-
ment, there is no legal framework behind this. 
Other EC countries have nothing of relevance ln this field. 
1.2  European Community: sex discrimination 
Sex discrimination is specifically prohibited in all EC countries, based on Article 119 of 
the EC Treaty of Rome. Where age discriminatory measures particularly affect older 
women workers, such as age limits ln recruitment or retirement ages, these could be 
legally challenged under sex discrimination provisions. To Ulustrate this, a European 
Court of Justice ruling was made in favour of a woman employee of a UK health author-
tty who had been compulsortly retired at the age of 60, whereas her male counterparts 
·were permitted to work untU age 65. 
The potential use of these common equal opportunities measures ln Europe to combat 
certain forms of age dlscrlmination could usefully be explored ln detaU. 
2 Legislative measures 
Legislative measures to assist older workers ln employment are described below. There is 
a separate section on France, ln view of the range of initiatives taken there. Examples of 
positive measures ln other countries are far less systematic. 
2.1  France: a series of positive measures 
Between 1987 and 1990 the French public authorities introduced a series of measures 
to limit job losses and promote longer working ltfe. Their wlllingness to act stemmed 
mainly from the soaring publtc cost of early retirement measures and from improved 
economic conditions. 
To date these measures have had llttle effect: most employers and trade unions still give 
priority to early exit for older workers. The early retirement culture has proved difficult 
to change, without a national consensus between publtc authorities and the social part-
ners. 
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One piece of anti-age dlscrlmlnation legislation pre-dates the employment measures: 
2.1.1  Ban on age l1m1ts 1n job advert1sements 1n pr1vate sector French Labour Law approved 
well before the 1980sn forb1ds  the use of upper age l1m1ts 1n pr1vate sector job advert1sements. 
Thl.s leg1slaUon 1s largely 1gnored 1ns1de France and has never been enforced. 
Since it only applles to advertisements, and not to the recruitment process, lt would 
have llttle direct impact on employers' real behaviour. Nevertheless lt has symbolic 
importance and other EC countries, notably the UK and the Netherlands, are debating 
the introduction of slmllar provisions. 
2.1.2  Employment promot1on measures
73 
Various measures have been passed ln order to: 
(i) Discourage early exlt: 
• impose financial penalties on companies using pre-retirement schemes funded 
by the Unemployment Fund, equivalent to an extra 6 months' salary payable to the 
Fund. 
·discourage employers' selection of older workers for redundancy. The 1989law74 
on prevention of redundancy introduced the term older worker (salarle age) for the 
first time in a legal text, but without any definition. 
·protect workers aged 50-54 from redundancy: companies using state-funded 
pre-retirement schemes for workers from age 55 may not make workers aged 50-54 
redundant. 
• restrict the criteria for pre-retirement schemes; 
·provide state aid for positive company measures to prevent early exit or to 
improve flexlbtlity of working time for older workers. 
• encourage companies to spread redundancies among all age groups; to consider 
Job transfers within the company; and to assist with finding new employment where 
necessary. 
(ll) Promote a longer working llfe: 
• by introducing progressive retirement schemes
75 for pensioners over 60 allowing 
part-time work to be combined wlth pensions. 
(lll) Assist re-integration lnto the labour market: 
·provide 100% exemption from employers' social security contributions for 
recruitment of unemployed age 50 and over, untll pensionable age. In 1991: 18,000 
workers benefitted from this scheme. 
• give special priority to the over 50s in employment measures for the long-term 
unemployed. 
·provide targeted assistance by state employment agencies for the unemployed 
over 50, lncludlng individual analysts of their potential for re-entering employment 
and personal support in retraining courses. 
• extend half-time contracts ln the publlc sector and wlth associations from 12 to 
24 months for the older unemployed. 
• increase part-time earnings allowances for the unemployed over 50. 
(iv) Support tralnlng lnltiatlves 
State subsidies were lntroduced for: 
• long-term company tralning for workers of 4 5 and over. 
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• 'tutorage' schemes where older workers traln and work wlth young recruits. 
(v) Government initlatlves 
In 1990 the Employment Mlnlstry set up a worktng group wlth the social partners to 
discuss ways of assisting older workers, which reported conclusions ln December 1990. 
In 1991 a research centre for study on age and the workforce
76 was created wlth the 
alm proposing measures to encourage workers to remaln ln the workforce. 
2.2  Other positive measures 
2.2.1  Protect1on aga1nst redundancy/dlsm1ssals 
Some form of protection exlsts ln Germany, Greece, Spain, France (see above), Italy and 
the Netherlands, and ln a draft law ln Ireland. 
Statutory provisions ln Spaln, Italy and the Netherlands protect against dlsmlssal or 
redundancy on grounds of age. In Spain, thls is contalned ln the Workers' Statute of 
1980 (see above). In Italy, the Constltutlonal court has ruled that dlsmlssals or redun-
dancies on grounds of age constitute unfalr dlsmlssal
77
• 
In the Netherlands, redundancy schemes targetlng workers aged 55 and over as 'first 
out' candidates have recently been prohlbited
71
• In cases of mass redundancies, checks 
are now made by employment offices to ensure no over-representation of older 
workers
79




Ireland is currently debating a proposed amendment to exlstlng legislation on unfalr 
dlsmlssals
81
,  to lnclude age as a criterion for unfair dismissal for workers aged over 50. 
Thls is likely to become law by end 1993. 
In Greece, case law 8 2 has established that ln cases of mass dismissals on economic 
grounds, employers should retaln older workers, provided they have the same skllls and 
productivity as other workers, ln order to avoid prejudicing their financial situation. 
Unfair dismissal can be claimed by older workers as a result. 
In Germany, special protection agalnst dlsmlssalls provided by many collective agree-
ments, negotiated by trade unions, coverlng 30-40% of the total workforce, and an esti-
mated 60% of workers employed under collective agreements. They do not provide 
general protection for all older workers, but only take effect after long service wlth the 
employer and at a set age, usually 55. Thls type of special protection cari discourage 
employers from recruitlng older workers. 
In Portugal, the official criteria for redundancies due to restructuring or economlc crlsls 
follow the last ln first out principle, whlch favours older workers with longer service. 
However, thls is not always strictly applled ln practice. 
2.2.2  Employmentlrecru1tment measures 
Belgium, Germany and Spain, ln addition to France, each have one employment 
scheme targeted at older workers: 
In Germany, wage subsidies of up to 75% and lasting up to eight years are paid for 
recruitment of the long-term unemployed over 50 on permanent contracts. But funds 
for thls scheme are limited and appltcatlons always exceed avatlable funds. 
In Spaln, employers recruiting the long-term unemployed over 45 receive a one-off state 
subsidy for each worker, plus a 50% reduction ln social security contributions for the 
length of the contract
13
• 
A Belgian employment promotion scheme
84 levies employer contributions to help 
specific rlsk groups. The target groups agreed by the social partners Include the unem-
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ployed over SO. 
In Greece, a one-year scheme
15 paying higher subsidies for recruitment of unemployed 
aged 56 to 60 was not repeated for economic reasons. 
2.2.3  Protecting income of  older unemployed 
In Germany, Greece, Spain, France and the Netherlands, unemployment benefits are 
paid to the older unemployed for longer periods or under more favourable conditions. 
This helps to protect their income. For example, in Germany, the unemployed over 54 
may claim unemployment benefits for up to 30 months. 
Pre-retirement allowances and early pensions avallable to the unemployed in several 
countries also protect their income, even if their practical effect has been to institution-
altse early exit. 
2.2.4  Age dlscrimination  in_ recruitment 
The Netherlands government is currently considering the option of legislation to ban 
the use of age llmlts in retirement advertisements with the aim of encouraging employ-
ers to use more objective evaluation crtterta. The publlc sector has no official age llmlts 
for recruitment, with some specific exceptions. 
There 1s a national campaign in the UK for legislation to ban age llmlts in recruitment 
advertisements16• The UK government 1s opposed to legislation, but has condemned the 
use of age llmlts ln recruitment
17
• State employment agencies have been instructed to 
query the use of age llmlts in vacancies advertised with them; surveys have indicated a 
recent reduction in the use of age llmlts with these agencies. One national newspaper, 
'The Guardian' refuses to publlsh job advertisements quoting age llmlts. 
Both the UK and Irish Civil Services have abollshed age llmtts in recruitment to all 
grades in recent years. 
2.2.5  Prohibltion of mandatory retirement 
In France and Germany, employment agreements which automatically termlnate work 
contracts at a specific age have been prohibited. 
In France a 1987law• prohibits 'gulllotine' clauses which automatically terminate 
work contracts at retirement age. It nevertheless permits employers to impose 
retirement at 60 or over, once employees quallfy for a full pension. 
Germany changed lts law in 1992
19 to ensure that contracts setting a specific age for 
termlnation were only valld with the express approval of the employee.  Previously, 
work contracts terminated automatically at 65 and had to be renegotiated with the 
employer and many collective agreements termlnated contracts at the early pension age 
of 60 for women and disabled workers. 
2.2.6  Changing retirement ages 
(i) Flexible retirement 
Belgium has establlshed a 5-year flexible retirement period between 60 and 65 for men 
and women. However, flexibllity above 60, is restricted for unemployed women. Both 
the UK and the Netherlands have considered flexible retirement options. 
Denmark, Germany and France have part-time working schemes both below and above 
normal retirement age, which combine with reduced pensions. In Germany since 1992 
working pensioners over 65 may defer their state pension and increase its final amount 
indefinitely: the previous limit of 6 7 years has been abolished. 
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All EC governments agreed on the principle of flexible retirement ln upwards as well as 
downwards directions ln 1982
90
• 
(ll) Raising the retirement age: Positive or negative? 
Germany, Greece and Italy have recently increased retirement ages, and proposals are 
under discussion in France and the UK. However, a higher retirement age is only posi-
tive lf  it changes the 'early retirement culture' and permits a longer working llfe for 
those who wlsh or need it. 
Most of the exlstlng or proposed measures wlll have negative effects on older workers 
and their pensions, as discussed ln Part 1, Chapter 5. In Italy, however, the increased 
retirement age does not affect the state pension, whlch can still be claimed after 3 5 
years of contributions. 
2.2.7  Internal Government 1n1t1atlves 
The UK Government stated in 1992
91 that it would discourage employers from using age 
barriers ln employment of older workers
92
• It has establlshed a special Advisory Group 
on older workers, including representatives of the social partners, wlth the alm of 
"encouraging and disseminating good employment practice wlth regard to older work-
ers" and educating employers ln thls field. 
3  Employers' and trade unions' good practice 
Brief descriptions of individual good practices by companies, trade unions and thelr 
organisations in several countries are given below, based on information provided. Other 
examples certainly exlst, but more detalled studies are needed to identify these. 
The good practices quoted relate to pollcies which combat age dlscriminatlon, such as 
specific recruitment of older workers or special training provisions for older personnel. 
In many cases, trade union support for employers' good practice is vital, but their role 
has not been analysed fully in this prellminary report. 
3.1  France 
Examples of good practice in French companies have been well documented ln recent 
years. A small selection ls quoted here; more comprehensive information is provided in 
the French report. Most examples focus on discouraging early retirement, which is the 
norm in many French companies. 
Societe Generale Sucrlere: It developed a special part-time retirement scheme for 
employees aged 55 to 60 to provide 5 months' employment each year, instead of retire-
ment at 55, ln order to use their expertise during the beet sugar harvest. 
OTIS (Llft manufacturer): A collective agreement of 1991 encourages workers to stay at 
work untll 60 by providing improved job and promotion prospects for those over 50, 
including training and re-skllling, and sharing experience wlth younger workers. It also 
provides for reduced working hours between ages 57 and 60. 
Aerospatlale: Faced wlth an ageing workforce structure and systematic loss of experi-
enced staff from 55, a specific personnel pollcy has been developed to encourage staff to 
remain untll 60. Each employee has an individual career plan lasting untll 60; and 
there ls a special training programme for all staff over 50. 
Thomson (electronics) and Phlldar (wool manufacturer): Both companies need to 
reduce their workforce, but have developed poltcles to avoid redundancies among work-
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ers aged 50 to 55, before their entitlement to pre-retirement schemes. They provide 
special tralnlng to help workers over 50 find short-term jobs elsewhere, but lf  this falls, 
they guarantee to keep the over-50s ln employment untll55. 
3.2  UK 
Employers' representatives: The UK Institute of Personnel Management (IPM) updated 
lts statement on ~ge  and Employment' in 1993. Thls proposes a code of good practice 
for employers on employment, recruitment and evaluation of older workers. A survey of 
personnel managers93 showed hlgh awareness of the IPM statement, ln both publlc and 
private sectors. Another surveyM found 42% of organisations questioned were encour-
aging managers to recruit older workers. 
B&Q (do-lt-yourself chainstore): has opened several stores wlth staff exclusively over 50 
to take advantage of their experience and better responses to customers. The staff 
received special eight weeks training in advance, wlth individual support from supervi-
sors in other stores. Both flexible hours and flexible retirement are avallable. 
Sainsburys and Tesco (two supermarket chains): have recently recruited staff up to the 
age of 69, due to perceived labour shortages. 
British Rall and British Telecom have changed their recruitment and training pollcles to 
allow older candidates to participate in training. 
3.3  Germany 
There are exceptional examples of companies which promote employment of older 
workers but such pollctes are almost never designed as standard offers, and are llnked 
to special company requirements or to spectfic employees. 
Trade unions and employee representatives: Strong employees' counclls defending older 
workers' rights are often found in companies wlth positive practices. 
The major iron and steel industry union, IG-Metall, ls now working on a new bargain-
ing pollcy wlth special emphasis in favour of older workers. This will include measures 
to lmprove qualtfications, to introduce flexible working tlme and to improve wage polt-
cles. The same unlon has recently negotiated collective bargaining agreements in 
Baden-Wurttemberg which ensure older workers are spectfically included in provisions 
for training and further education. 
Employers' associations: The Federal Association of German Employers ls currently 
updating, ln conjunction wlth trade union organisations, its guidellnes and recommen-
dations on employment of older workers, originally issued ln the late 19  70s. 
Bayer: (pharmaceuticals) finds older employees more objective and rellable, particularly 
ln monitoring of chemical procedures. It uses training programmes to update all work-
ers, regardless of age and runs voluntary evening classes in computer skills, which are 
popular wlth older workers as they allow them to learn at their own pace. 
3.4  The Netherlands 
There is increasing debate between employers and trade unions on the position of older 
workers as part of collective bargaining. More employers are consciously developing a 
special poltcy for older workers, but this is often used as a bargaining tool, for example 
to agree less costly early retirement conditions. 
ffiM-Netherlands: developed specific training programmes for manual workers aged 
around 50, in response to a hlgh drop-out rate among older manual workers. It has 
found it cost-effective to offer job transfers through retraining, rather than pay htgh 
dlsabllity allowances or early retirement benefits to older workers95• 
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3.5  Greece 
DELTA (food Industry): provides specific tralnlng for older workers. It has found this 
cost-effective, even lf  workers leave after one or two years. 18% of participants in 
computer and data processing training are currently over 50. 
In developing these pollcies, the management was lnfluenced by the results of an Anglo-
American study, demonstrating that workers over 50 were often more easUy trained 
than younger staff. 
3.6  Belgium 
Glaverbel (glass industry): has developed a specific training poltcy to keep its older work-
ers at work, ln response to a lack of young quallfied workers. It also alms to change 
management attitudes towards older employees. 
4  Conclusions and recommendations 
4.1  Conclusions 
Since a change ln employers' and trade union attitudes towards older workers will be 
essential in combating age discrimination at work, systematic information is needed in 
thls area so that examples of successful measures taken by employers and unions can be 
highltghted. 
4.2  Recommendations 
An EC-wlde exchange of experience between employers, personnel managers and trade 
unions which have developed positive pollcies for older workers could disseminate infor-
mation on good practice and provide new ideas for personnel management in different 
EC countries. 
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Chapter 7 - Anti-age discrimination legislation 
in the USA 
The American Age Dtscrlmlnatlon In Employment Act (ADEA) has been in force since 
19  6 7. Thgether with related legislation, it provides the most comprehensive legal 
protection against age discrimination in the world
96
• Yet the US Congress has concluded 
that age dlscrlminatlon is still an obstacle to employment for older workers and that 
"statutory provisions against age discrimination remain incomplete and somewhat inef-
fective"'7. 
1 The scope of the ADEA 
The ADEA became law ln 1967. Its ortglnalleglslative alm was restricted to tackllng 
the specific problem of age llmlts applled in recruitment, which had been identified in a 
report to the US congress. However, the growing US civtl rights movement in the 
1960s, combined with the constitutional guarantee of equal protection for US cltlzens 
led to the development of more comprehensive legal protection for older workers. 
The ADMs stated alms are to: 
• promote employment of older persons based on abillty rather than age; 
• prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; 
• help employers and workers to overcome problems arising from the impact of 
age on employment. 
It outlaws age dlscrlmlnatlon in a wide range of employment practices: recruitment; 
dismissals; payment of compensation and other benefits; terms and conditions of 
employment, including promotion; job descriptions and job referrals; provision of privi-
leges; union membership, etc. It applles to employers with 20 workers or more, includ-
ing state and local governments; to employment agencies; to labour organisations with 
25 or more members and to the Federal Government. 
It originally covered workers between 40 and 65, mainly in the private sector. A series 
of amendments have extended the cover to most workers over 40, without an upper age 
llmtt, in both publtc and private sectors. Mandatory retirement has thus been effectively 
aboltshed. The Act also outlaws dlscrlmlnatlon between different groups of older work-
ers, l.e. an employer may not favour a 50-year old over a 65-year old on grounds of 
age. 
Various provisions of the ADEA, and notably a related Act, the Older Workers Benefit 
Protection Act (OWBPA) of 1990, alm to prohibit discrimination in terms of employee 
benefits for older workers, except when costs to the employer are disproportionately 
high. The Act is based on the principle of equal benefits or equal cost to the employer: 
where the cost of certain benefits, such as ltfe insurance, increases with age, the 
employer must make equal amounts of contributions for older and younger workers, 
even though the older worker may receive a lower entitlement or coverage as a result. 
The Act thereby alms to ensure employers are not discouraged from htring or retaining 
older workers due to increased employee costs, whtle preserving the principle of non-
dlscrlmlnatlon against older employees. 
In addttlon, the OWBPA regulates early retirement incentives to ensure that they are 
voluntary and it establtshes stringent standards for the widespread employer practice of 
encouraging employees to sign waivers of thetr ADEA rights when leaving work. These 
waivers are only valld provided strict conditions are met regarding the understanding 
and acceptance of the waivers. 
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2 Exceptions 
Among vartous exceptions to the coverage of ADEA, the following are noteworthy. 
Workers over 40 may be excluded from apprenticeship training programmes, although 
older workers' rights 1n other types of training are protected. The resulting exclusion of 
workers over 40 from employer and trade union training schemes was condemned by 
the US Congress report of 1993
91
• 
Employers may apply age limits lf lt can be proved that there is a legitimate reason for 
using age as a qualification for the Job, for example in public safety posts or teenage 
modelling. In addition, it is legitimate for employers to take actions based upon criteria 
which apply to all workers, regardless of age. For example, the ADEA does not protect 
against mass redundancies or dismissals based on poor performance. However, ellgibU-
lty for a pension is based on age and cannot therefore be used as a good reason 1n 
deciding redundancies or benefits. 
3 Implementation of the legislation 
The original alm of the legislators was to encourage conciliation between employers 
and older workers and to avoid litigation. In practice, only a very small number of 
ADEA cases go to court, since employers tend to make advance settlements in cases 
they believe they will lose. Success rates of court actions are low, but slmllar to actions 
taken under other Civll Rights employment dlscrlmlnatlon legislation. 
Overall, nearly half the complaints involve unlawful dismissal, about 1 in 7 concern 
recruitment and only 1 in 20 are related to promotion. Of those which become court 
cases, however, over 75% are related to dismissal; followed by 9% Involving 
recruitment. 
The legislation is enforced by the federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 
(EEOC) in conjunction wlth the state Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs), 
where they exist. Complaints of age discrlmlnatlon have been the fastest growing field 
of charges filed under equal employment opportunity legislation and made up a quarter 
of all discrlmlnatlon charges received by EEOC in 1991. 
However, the administration and enforcement of the legislation has been subject to 
extensive critlclsm for delays, inadequate investigation and the modest lltigatlon record. 
4 The impact of the ADEA 
Contrary to the assumptions of the legislators 1n the 1960s, age discrlmlnatlon still 
appears prevalent in today's US workplace.  Surveys" show that 80% of Americans 
belleve most employers discriminate against older workers - the same proportion as in 
Europe.
100 
4.1  Employers' attitudes 
Surveys of US employers show that most recognise there is widespread age discrlmlna-
tlon and also reveal that negative attitudes towards older workers persist, particularly 
regarding their productivity, flexibillty and capacity to use new technology. There are 
some good examples of training for older workers, but the practices are not widespread. 
Underlying employers' attitudes have changed little, despite improvements ln objective 
employment assessment. Most employers do the mlnlmum to avoid llablllty under the 
ADEA. They frequently use early retirement plans and only rarely take lnitiatlves to 
extend the working llfe. 
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4.2  Employment situation for older US workers 
One of the main goals of the ADEA was to promote employment of older workers, 
although ortgtnally only up to age 65. 
Yet the employment to population ratio for all workers aged 55 and over has fallen from 
37.7% ln 1967 to 29.1% ln 1990, and for male workers from 53.2% to 37%
101
• The 
unemployment rate for the 55-64 age group rose from 3.3% in 1990 to 3.9% in 1991, 
representing a 19% increase in total numbers. Nevertheless, this rate is lower than in 
EC countries. 
Despite the abolttion of mandatory retirement, about threequarters of workers draw 
their state pension at 62 and a wlde range of voluntary retirement incentives are offered 
by employers to those below 65. As in Europe, most economic incentives are directed 
towards older workers leaving the work force. So the average working ltfe has not been 
extended; but, although numbers are relatively small, labour force participation of those 
over 65 is significantly higher in the US than in Europe. 
4.3  Positive achievements 
The ADEA has stopped blatant dlscrtmlnatlon in Job advertisements and it appears to 
help older workers seeking another Job. Although the average tlme spent finding a new 
Job for unemployed 55-64 years olds has increased in recent years, it was stlll only 21 
weeks in 1991. 
The existence of legal protection has also encouraged some employers to introduce more 
objective evaluation procedures (of older workers) in recruitment and employment. In 
cases where employers have demonstrated good practice in using objective criteria to 
assess workers' performance, regardless of age, their prospects for successfully defending 
age discrtmlnatlon charges have improved. 
The specific safeguards against dismissal on grounds of age also appear to have 
protected older workers from over-representation in the redundancies of the 1980s. 
More recently older workers appear to have been increasingly exposed to lay-offs, but 
thls seems to be a feature of their concentration in certain tndustry sectors more than a 
product of their age as such. 
5 Conclusions 
The ADEA provides protection of older workers' rights in employment and has 
prevented the most blatant forms of age discrlmlnation. It has not, however, increased 
employment opportunities for older workers, nor extended the working ltfe of the major-
tty. 
The ADEA was based on protection of civll rights; it was not designed as a comprehen-
sive employment plan for older workers. This approach has, overall, provided disincen-
tives rather than encouragement to employers to develop the potential of the ageing 
workforce. The mere existence of legislation has clearly falled to change employers' atti-
tudes and preJudices towards older workers, as the ortginallegislators had hoped. 
European prtorlties are likely to focus on employment and Jobcreation for older workers, 
in view of the economic lmpltcatlons of demographic trends, rather than the protection 
of workers' rlghts. 
The US model of comprehensive protective legislation is therefore not suited to European 
needs or traditions. However, its success ln ellmlnatlng direct age discrlmlnatlon in 
recruitment and training, for example, could be reproduced wlth parttallegislatlon in 
Europe and would provide a potential recourse in the courts for older workers. 
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The European context and the 
potential for future action 
Age dlscr1m1natlon has so far been analysed 1n terms of  1ts Impact on 1ndlv1dual older workers. 
Thls section considers age d1scr1mlnatlon ln today's European context and the potential for 
future action to combat dlscr1m1natory practices. Age discrimination against older workers in the European Community 
Chapter 8 - The key actors: governments, the social 
partners, older workers and society 
Governments, employers and trade unions are the key actors in combating discr1m1na-
tion at the workplace. Yet older workers themselves also need to play an active role in 
improving their work prospects and in overcoming seH- discr1m1nation. 
Many other actors are also involved in shaping attitudes towards older workers, includ-
ing younger work colleagues, employment agencies, publishers of job advertisements, 
etc. Their behaviour reflects the views of society 1n general. 
To date, very llttle information exists on the attitudes of the key actors towards older 
workers or the concept of age d1scr1m1nation. The indications below are therefore based 
on anecdotal comments, rather than systematic evidence. More detatled studies are 
needed in this field. 
1 Governments 
Older workers have so far been low on government pollcy priorities. Faced with rtstng 
unemployment, most have deliberately given prtortty to creating jobs for young work-
ers. However, increases in numbers of older workers are llkely to push them up the 
pollcy agenda and there are already some signs of government action. 
Moves taken so far to restrict early retirement or raise retirement ages have, however, 
been cost-driven, in response to the problems of financing social security systems. They 
have not been inspired by the ideal of Improving opportunities for older workers. 
All EC governments have condemned sex and race discrimination, but none has yet 
formally recognised age discrlminatlon - at work or in other fields - as an equal oppor-
tunities issue. Nevertheless, a publlc debate about age discrlmtnatlon has started in 
both the UK and the Netherlands. 
1.1  Reducing costs 
The costs of supporting systematic early exit are rising and some northern European 
governments have already moved to restrict the scope of early retirement schemes 
and/or to transfer more of the costs onto companies. The debate about closing the early 
invalldity pension loophole has also started in several countries. In Greece the levels of 
disabUlty needed for an tnvalldity pension have already been 1ncreased
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Several governments have implemented or are debating pension reforms which will 
raise the pensionable age, extend the working llfe, and/or reduce state pension levels. 
Unemployment, redundancy and other social security costs wtll keep rising, however, lf 
early exlt continues and workers remain dependent on social protection for long periods 
untll retirement age. Unemployment costs for the over-50s are particularly high where 
benefits are calculated on the last salary and are paid for longer periods to older work-
ers. In France, for example, studies show that the unemployed over 50 cost on average 
nearly 5 times more than those under 50. 
In view of the need to reduce social spending, there is a rtsk that governments may 
move to reduce further the costs of supporting older inactive workers without ensuring 
more employment opportunities for this group. Reductions in soclal security cover, 
possibly combined with longer periods of inactlvlty before retirement age would result 
in greater discrlmlnation against older workers. 
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1.2  Promoting employment for older workers 
No government except France has introduced specific measures to discourage early extt 
of older workers and tmprove their work opportunities. 
The French Initiatives have so far had little positive Impact on Increasing employment 
among older workers, because there ls no national consensus with employers and trade 
unions. The early extt culture has proved difficult to change. 
Other governments might be encouraged to consider Introducing targeted measures for 
older workers, If  the cost- effectiveness of these actions were establlshed, as well as the 
potential productivity of older workers. 
1.3  Promoting debate 
The publtc debate about older workers In employment has begun In some countries, 
such as Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK, but has yet to produce concrete actions. 
Both the UK and France have Initiated a dialogue wtth the social partners on older 
workers' Issues and ln the UK In particular thts is directed at persuading employers to 
employ and recruit more older staff. 
1.4  Conclusions 
Governments are only llkely to review their poltctes on older workers ln terms of reduc-
ing costs. However, If  promotion of employment and training for older workers proves 
cost-effective, this could also benefit older workers, provided there is support from the 
social partners. 
2  Employers 
For one reason or another, most employers across Europe appear to target older workers 
for job-shedding. These practices are probably due to a combination of economic Incen-
tives to let older workers go, a lack of training leading to outdated skllls and negative 
stereotypes regarding older workers' abiltttes. 
2.1  Early exit culture: the economic factors 
Certain economic factors encourage employers to select older workers for Job losses, 
related to higher costs of wages and other special benefits, and reduced productivity due 
to outdated work skllls or fatltng health. Greece ln particular has reported systematic 
dismissal of workers from 3 5 onwards on cost grounds. 
However, the financlallncentlve provided to employers ln northern Europe by state 
subsidies for early and pre- retirement has made tt profitable for them to concentrate the 
great majority of Job losses on older workers. In addition, the subsidised schemes have 
been used, for example ln France, to replace more costly older workers wtth lower pald 
younger staff. 
Companies have been reluctant to abandon these Incentives where publtc authorities 
have tried to reduce the scope for early retirement. In Belgium, after ellgtbtltty criteria 
were tightened up, the multi-national firm Caterptllar declared large financial losses and 
qualtfied for pre- retirement subsidies: but it was later found the losses had been fabri-
cated by transferring money to a sister company. In Germany, and no doubt In other 
countries, companies are keen to take advantage of exceptions allowed for 'economic 
circumstances'. 
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In countries without state-subsidised early exit, many large companies nevertheless 
operate their own version of the schemes by providing generous redundancy 
settlements to older employees, while others target older workers for dismissal or redun-
dancy with only minimum compensation. 
Incentives to reverse thls early exlt culture among employers wlll need to take account 
of their different economic interests. Studies show that big companies are keen to use 
tax incentives and state subsidies, whereas small and medium-sized companies are 
more interested in well- trained and productive staff. 
2.2  Re-organisation of working time 
There are indications of employers' reluctance to allow parttlme or flexible working 
tlme for older workers, where public pollcles offer such options. Thls could be due to a 
combination of economic factors and trade union opposition. It ls an aspect needing 
further investigation in view of lts potential benefits for older employees. 
2.3  Stereotypes 
Negative assumptions of the productivity, adaptabillty and motivation of older workers 
appear widespread among many employers. These prejudices may be used partly to 
Justify economic considerations. Studies in France and the UK have shown employers' 
attitudes changing in different economic cllmates. In the 1960s, during economic 
growth and labour shortages, employers felt older workers were dependable, 
experienced and efficient workers to be kept at work. Whereas ln recent times of high 
unemployment, older workers are considered the opposite and employers say they must 
golo3. 
These stereotypes no doubt contribute significantly to the general lack of training provi-
sion or personnel planning for older employees. 
Individual companies have seen beyond the stereotypes and Introduced positive 
measures to train or adapt working conditions for older workers. But they remain the 
exception to the rule. 
2.4  Changing perspectives 
Widespread early exlt, combined wlth lack of recruitment of younger workers, has 
already distorted the workforce age structures tn many companies. These companies, 
notably in France, are beginning to recognise the personnel management problems of a 
workforce aged almost exclusively between 30 and SO and to take positive actions with 
workers over SO. 
A few larger companies wlth long-term planning departments, for example ln Germany 
and the UK, are now considering the role of older workers ln the future in the context 
of demographic trends. 
2.5  Conclusions 
The potential for changing employers' attitudes towards early exlt ln the current 
European recession is llmlted. 
More Information is needed on employer attitudes across Europe in order to determtne 
the prospects for a change of approach. The economic interests of employers certainly 
need to be engaged and financtallncentlves may be part of the solution, but better 
tratntng and evidence of older workers' productivity wtll no doubt play an important 
part ln any long-term change of attitudes. 
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3  Trade unions 
From the llmlted information avallable, it appears that to date many trade unions have 
not actively supported pollcies to keep older workers at work and have accepted the 
early exlt culture  .  . 
3.1  Acceptance of early exit 
In Italy trade unions apparently give priority to defending the rights of those who stlll 
have jobs and tacitly accept that older workers wtlllose out. But they are also pressing 
for 'soclal buffers' to protect the older unemployed from financial hardship. In Spain 
and Greece unions reported concern over the targeting of older workers for job losses, 
but appeared unable to take effective action to defend them. 
In the UK,  trade unions have sometimes put pressure on employers to use 'voluntary' 
redundancy packages targeted at older workers in order to avoid compulsory redundan-
cies which could be spread across the en  tire workforce. 
Several countries report that trade unions have defended younger workers' jobs at the 
expense of older staff on the grounds of 'solidarity between generations'. In Denmark 
and Germany, there are examples of unions encouraging older workers to accept early 
retirement in order to release jobs for younger workers. A recent survey of Danish 
employers (ound that some were discouraged from trytng to retain older workers, due to 
the pressures on them to take early retirement from trade unions and work colleagues. 
In northern Europe, the trade unions fight for the 'right' to early retirement to be main-
tained, as the alternative to unemployment for older workers. Such attitudes are ltkely 
to encourage employers to continue getting rid of older workers, rather than consider 
ways of retaining them. 
3.2  Re-organisation of working time 
Some trade unions have opposed part-ttme retirement options for older workers, which 
would have enabled them to continue at work. 
3.3  Positive support for older workers 
Strong trade union support for older workers has however been a key factor in positive 
employer initiatives, where they exist. In Germany, some unions such as IG-Metall are 
starting to negotiate the specific inclusion of older workers in company training provi-
sions and special protection against dismissal is common in collective agreements. In 
France, unions have supported company schemes to keep older workers at work after 
55. 
In addition, trade unions in several countries have negotiated various privtleges and 
benefits for older workers, although these can sometimes prejudice their chances of 
keeping or obtaining employment. 
3.4  Conclusions 
Positive pressure from trade unions could be particularly helpful in persuading govern-
ments and employers to take practical action to combat both direct and indirect discrim-
ination against older workers. 
In particular, trade union support for pollcies to retain older workers in either full or 
part-ttme employment could help to promote employment opportunities in the future. 
This important area needs more detatled investigation. 
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4 Older workers 
Little is known of older workers' own preferences for work ln later ltfe, lf  the financial 
tmplications were neutral and they were gtven a real choice of when to stop work. 
At present, overall attitudes towards early extt seem to be governed largely by the 
financial consequences, with many workers in northern Europe welcoming early retfre-
ment schemes, and those in southern Europe and former East Germany who receive 
relatively low social benefits betng most clearly opposed. 
4.1  Self-discrimination 
There is some evidence that older workers self-dlscrlmlnate at work by fatling to apply 
for company tralnlng after 40 or 45, or by a loss of motivation in the years before  · 
expected early rettrement. This may be due to their acceptance of negative stereotypes 
of betng 'too old to learn' and of society's devaluation of the agelng process ln general. 
But lt is almost certainly also the result of ageist attitudes by younger work colleagues. 
Those who want to conttnue tn work need to be informed and encouraged to take posi-
tive actions to make this possible, particularly wtth regard to ongoing traintng ln order 
to keep work skills updated. 
4.2  Conclusions 
Systematic information is needed on the preferences and views of older workers them-
selves regarding potential choices of part-ttme or full-ttme work, early rettrement or 
possibillties for work after retlrement age. 
Awareness needs to be raised now among today's middle-aged workers in order for 
them to take action to tmprove thetr employment prospects in 10 or 20 years' ttme. 
5 Public opinion and society 
Industrtallsed societies appear to devalue the agelng process tn general. Indeed, a 
central atm of this European Year of Older People is to encourage society to recognise 
the positive potential of older people ln general. 
Negative vtews of older workers' potential could be part of the reason for the 
wtdespread social acceptance of early extt from work, wtth notable exceptions in former 
East Germany, Greece and Portugal. 
Attitudes of work colleagues towards older workers are most significant, however, since 
they put into practice at the workplace the pollcies decided by governments and 
employers. 
Nevertheless, a recent publlc opinion survey•ot revealed a clear awareness across Europe 
of dlscrlmlnation against older workers. Consistently high majorities- over 70% or 
80%-of the publlc of all ages in all ECcountries said they belleved age discrtmtnatlon 
at work existed and condemned it as unfatr. Thls may reflect a growing sensitivity to 
the problems of older workers, whlch could increase as the numbers of those over 40 
grow. 
5.1  Conclusions 
Society's views of agetng may change wtth the increased numbers of older people. The 
next generation of older workers will be better educated, more numerous and probably 
better organised polltically than today's over-50s. A potential 'grey' lobby in Europe 
could mobtlise publlc support and influence attitudes of all the key actors. 
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6  Recommendations 
i) European-wide studies are needed ln the following areas: 
• views and practices of employers and trade unions towards older workers 
and job-seekers. 
• cost-benefit analysts of employment and training measures for older workers, 
ln relation to social security costs of supporting lnactivlty untU retirement age. 
• productivity and tralnlng potential of older workers 
• preferences and attitudes of older workers themselves. 
ll) PUot demonstration projects on the re-tralnlng capacity of older workers should be 
promoted across Europe  These could be based on exlstlng good practice ln lndlvldual 
companies. 
ill) A dialogue at both national and European level between governments and social 
partners should be promoted to ralse awareness of older workers' potential. 
iv) Education and awareness campaigns need to be directed both at older workers them-
selves and society as a whole. 
v) Targeted employment promotion and tralnlng measures for older workers need to be 
established,. lncludlng financlallncentlves for employers. 
Notes 
102. OBCD (1992). 
103. Law 1902/90, 11 October 1990. 
104. NaUonm report for France. 
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Chapter 9 - The potential for future action 
1 The economic and employment context 
The potential for action to combat age discrimination in employment will be largely 
determined by the impact of European economic and employment conditions on 
governments and the social partners. Current conditions provide both 'push' and 'pull' 
factors, acting for and against positive action. 
1.1  The 'pull' factors: economic and employment trends 
The current recession will further reduce employment opportunities and the medium-
to long-term prospects are no better. Even when economic growth recovers, there may 
be only limited creation of new Jobs, many of which will be more suited to young, tech-
nologically trained workers. 
The predicted growth in the lower paid services sectors could provide some opportuni-
ties for older workers. However, they will be competing for Jobs with other 'new' groups 
of labour, in particular women and young lmmlgrant workers. 
The increased proportion of older workers in the workforce is therefore in practtc_e 
unlikely to produce an increased need for them in the labour market after the current 
recession. 
1.2  The 'push' factors: economic implications of demographic trends 
The effects of demographic ageing combined with high unemployment will, however, 
have economic lmpllcations for governments as ratios of workers to dependent pension-
ers decrease. In addition, if  the current early exit trend continues, the costs of support-
ing larger numbers of older inactive workers wlll escalate. 
These economic factors have opened the debate about extending the working llfe in 
order to help finance social security systems. 
Another potential 'push' factor on governments could be the development of an active 
'grey' lobby in Europe as numbers of older people grow. 
1.3  Conflicting interests: the need for consensus 
Governments' recently perceived need to extend the working llfe is directly opposed to 
the previous trend of shortening it to reduce unemployment problems. These new 
priorities are llkely to conflict with the economic 'pull' on employers to reduce their 
workforce. 
Older workers themselves will only benefit lf measures to increase the working llfe bring 
improved employment opportunities, and not only reductions in social security cover. 
There may prove to be financial incentives for goverments to promote employment for 
the increasing numbers of older workers - and so help to combat age discrimination -
but governments cannot act alone on these issues. There has to be support from 
employers and trade unions for any change of pollcy towards older workers. 
2 The citizen's rights approach 
Unllke the USA, Europe as a whole has no strong civil rights tradition. Comprehensive 
protective legislation to outlaw age discrimination based on the American model, ls 
therefore not a realistic option in Europe. 
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Thls does not, however, exclude some political and legal recognition of age discrimina-
tion. A ltmited approach to outlaw the use of directly dtscrtmtnatory age ltmtts in 
employment could be based on the principles of equal opportunities for workers and the 
European concept of clttzen's rights. This partial legislative approach would have a legal 
basts or precedent in several EC countries which already have relevant legal provisions. 
The citizen's rights approach could potentially be more effective in engaging the inter-
ests of employers and trade unions than publtc pollctes based solely on economic issues. 
It would also raise awareness among older workers and society as a whole. 
3  The role of legislation versus voluntary measures 
The European debate about future action to combat age discrimination ls llkely to 
centre on the merits of legislation versus voluntary or persuasive measures. 
3.1  Legislation: the 'partial' approach 
Legislation can be useful in sending clear signals of government poltcy changes towards 
older workers and in promoting informed debate. Two types of legislative action have 
been proposed as ways of combating age discrtmtnatton. 
First, a parttallegislattve approach to protect older workers' rights by outlawing discrim-
inatory age ltmtts in employment practices. This would help to stimulate publtc debate 
on the role of older workers and to encourage employers to use objective criteria based 
on skills and experience to evaluate older workers. 
Second, statutory measures to discourage early extt from work and to promote employ-
ment and training of older workers. These would need to provide financial incentives for 
employers, since they do not currently share governments' economic interests in 
promoting employment for older workers. 
3.2  Persuasion and voluntary agreements 
It  is clear that legislation alone cannot change attitudes among employers or society in 
general, as the French experience has shown. Even 25 years of comprehensive anti-age 
discrtmtnation legislation in the USA has fatled to develop widespread positive attitudes 
towards older workers. 
Persuasive measures aimed at changing attitudes in the workplace will no doubt prove 
an essential part of any poltcy to improve older workers' employment prospects and to 
combat age dtscrtmtnation. Non-legislative actions could include government dialogue 
with the social partners, promotion of good practice, and exchange of experience 
between employers' and trade union representatives at national and European levels. 
These have the advantage of lower costs for governments and some have already tnttt-
ated such actions, with or without legislative measures. 
4  Conclusions 
In the current European context, governments and employers wtll consider older work-
ers primartly in terms of their economic tmpltcations. 
This does not, however, affect the potential for legislative measures in the short-term to 
provide equal opportunities by outlawing the use of age ltmlts. 
The medium-term interests of governments are ltkely to be served by promoting 
increased employment for the larger numbers of over 50s. In this case, the interests of 
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tndlvlduals 1n combating wtder forms of age dlscrtmlnation 1n employment could coin-
cide wtth those of governments. 
Active measures would then be needed to engage the interests of employers, trade 
unions and other actors. Legislative and voluntary measures could be used to greatest 
effect ln combination to achieve positive changes in attitude. 
Notes 
105. Burobarometer survey 1992. 
106. Burobarometer survey 1992. 
107. Councll RecommenclllUon of  June 1992. 
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1 General conclusions 
In tdenttfytng age dtscrlmlnatory practices, thts study has examined older workers' prob-
lems from the potnt of vtew of citizen's rights and equal opportunities at work. Whtle 
many of the conclusions reached on the need for positive action are stmtlar to those of 
other European studies, the Justlficatton for action ts different; tt ts based on the prtnct-
ple of ctttzens' rights whtch should allow workers a choice to work and of when to stop 
work. 
Age dtscrtmtnation has been tdenttfied ln some form ln all EC countries, even though 
the tnformatlon provided ts not always systematic. It ts evident tn direct forms, where 
age llmlts are used to exclude older workers from work, or from tratntng and employ-
ment measures; and ln indirect forms where older workers are tn practice disadvantaged 
at work or tn seeking work on grounds of thetr age, without specific age ltmtts being set. 
Thts covert dtscrlmtnatton has the widest impact on older workers' employment 
prospects; lt wlll also be the hardest to combat, stnce tt reflects many baste assumptions 
of our society. 
The most significant impact on older workers ts thetr systematic exclusion from work 
from age 50 onwards- between 10 and 15 years before 'normal' retirement age. Age 
dtscrlmtnation works first to exclude them from employment; and once a job ts lost, 
from 45 or earlter, lt ts often impossible to re-enter employment. 
Thls situation has been impltcttly or expltcltiy encouraged by governments, employers 
and trade unions, whtch have gtven priority to young workers tn ttmes of rtstng unem-
ployment. It has been widely accepted by publtc opinion tn most countries, although 
there ts recent evidence of changing attttudes
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Some governments are showing increased awareness of older workers' problems, tn the 
ltght of demographic trends and thetr economic impltcattons for social security systems. 
If  they perceive an economic interest ln promoting employment for older workers, they 
could be potential alltes in helping to combat age discrtmtnatton at work. However, the 
support of the social partners would be essential in order to change current trends. 
2 Recommendations for action in Europe 
These recommendations for action are addressed almost exclusively to governments, 
since the examtnatton of dtscrtmination focussed on statutory measures. 
The proposals are for a combination of legislation and persuasive measures. A partial 
legislative approach ts proposed tn two parts: to establtsh equal opportunities for older 
workers by aboltshing dtscrtminatory age limits; and to promote positive employment 
measures targeted at older workers. These statutory measures should be supported by 
persuasive actions with the social partners, and with older workers themselves. 
The recommendations are presented as short- or medium-term actions, directed at 
direct or tndtrect forms of discrimination and for action at European or national levels. 
They cover the main recommended actions proposed tn the report itself. 
It ts important to take some action tmmedtately, since by the turn of the century, several 
EC countries wtll be faced with significant increases tn numbers of older workers. The 
current generation of middle-aged workers need education and preparation now, before 
they reach the end of their working ltves. 
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3 Short term actions 
3.1  Combating direct discrimination 
Direct forms of dlscrlmlnatlon are the easiest to tdenttfy and to address first. 
3.1.1  At European level 
(1)  European-wide ban on age llmlts in recruitment advertisements Binding European 
legislation would be a powerful symboltc message to employers to reconsider their use of 
age llmlts and to extend the debate about age dlscrlmlnation in employment. It should 
apply to both private and publlc sectors, including the EC institutions, so that govern-
ments can demonstrate exemplary good practice. 
Thls measure should eventually be extended to cover the whole recruitment process, but 
this must be a declslon for national authorities, ln view of the enforcement tmpllcatlons. 
3.1.2  At national level 
1) Abolish obltgatory early exlt at a specific age 
Early or pre-retirement schemes which set a specific age for early extt should be volun-
tary, not obltgatory. Thls should apply to schemes operated by the state or the private 
sector. This allows tndtvtdual workers a greater choice. 
11) Aboltsh upper age llmlts on employment measures for unemployed Age ltmlts which 
exclude the older unemployed above a set age from government training schemes, 
employment promotion measures or assistance from employment agencies should be 
abollshed. 
lll) Outlaw mandatory retirement at a set age in collective agreements 
Collective agreements lmposlng a set age for exlt from work should be outlawed, as in 
France and Germany. Such agreements should only be valld by C9nsent of the individual 
worker. 
tv) Provide legal protection against dismissal on grounds of age All countries should 
introduce legal protection against dismissal or redundancy on grounds of age alone for 
older workers up to retirement age. 
3.2  Combating income discrimination 
Income dlscrlminatlon against the older unemployed ls evident in direct and indirect 
forms where lt presents a poverty rlsk for older workers. Removing thts dlscrlmlnation 
will have financlaltmpllcatlons for governments, particularly ln southern Europe. The 
provisions of the EC Recommendation on minimum social benefits
106 support the prlncl-
ple of a mlnlmum guaranteed income. 
1)  Change pension calculations to prevent extreme pension penalties for the older unem-
ployed 
No disproportionate penalties on final pension income should be imposed on workers 
who become unemployed before retirement age. Old age pension entitlement should not 
be calculated solely on income earned during the last years before retirement age. 
11)  A mlnlmum guaranteed income for older unemployed 
All countries should ensure a reasonable level of support for long-term unemployed, 
after unemployment benefits run out. Thls support should continue unttl official 
pensionable age for all older unemployed. 
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3.3  Combating indirect discrimination 
Other short-term actions are possible to start the process of combating the wlder Indi-
rect forms of age discrimination and to establlsh systematic information as a basts for 
future action. In particular, specific targeting of older workers ln employment and traln-
lng measures 1s needed; without it, they wlll not benefit from general measures and wlll 
depend increasingly on social protection systems before retirement. 
1.3.1  At European level 
1) Target older workers for training and Job-creation measures in the European Social 
Fund 
The reformed European Social Fund should identify older workers and older long-term 
unemployed as specific target groups for tralnlng and Job-creation measures by govern-
ments and private sector employers, to ensure they are properly represented in such 
schemes. 
11)  Create European networks to exchange experience and promote European-wide stud-
ies of good practice 
EC-wlde networks of employers and personnel managers; trade unions; and state or 
private sector employment agencies should be created wlth the alm of exchanging expe-
riences of good practice tn employment, recruitment and trainlng of older workers. EC 
studies of such good practice and of the productivity and potential of older workers at 
work should dlssemlnate Information among the key actors ln all countries. 
ttl) Provision of age-related employment market statistics Eurostat, the Community's 
statistical service, should require Member States to provide age-related statistics, compa-
rable across the Community, on all relevant areas of labour market pollcies. In particu-
lar, statistics should be produced on all older lnactlve workers below retirement age and 
full age breakdowns provided In redundancy figures. 
3.3.2  At nat1onallevel 
i) Discourage employers from targeting older workers for Job losses 
In conjunction with employment promotion measures, governments should reduce 
subsidies which act as incentives for employers to concentrate Job losses on older work-
ers. These include early and pre-retirement schemes and redundancy subsidies. More 
costs of early exit should be transferred to employers. 
11)  Provide targeted employment promotion and tralnlng measures for older 
unemployed 
Employment promotion and tralnlng measures should be targeted at the needs of older 
unemployed 1n order to increase their chances of finding alternative employment. 
Special assistance from state employment agencies should also be provided. 
lll) Provide financlallncenttves to employers for employment of older unemployed 
All governments should lntroduce some lncentives to recruit and employ the older 
unemployed, such as exemptions from social security contributions. This could prove 
attractive to many employers ln a recession. 
lv) Set up national dialogues with employers and trade unions All EC governments 
should create a forum for debate with employers' and trade union organisations on the 
potential for older .workers ln employment, age dtscrlmlnation issues and personnel 
management of an agelng workforce. 
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4  Medium-term actions 
Several of the proposed short-term actions to combat indirect dlscrlmlnation will only 
produce results tn the medium- to long-term. The real need Is to change employer and 
trade unton attitudes towards employment of older workers and this tmplles a consistent 
long-term approach. The self-dlscrlmtnatory views of many older workers themselves 
will also need to be addressed. 
Employment promotion and measures to safeguard older workers' rights can be further 
developed from the tnlttal measures to outlaw direct dtscrtmtnation. However, Increased 
protection of older workers will have economic tmpllcattons for employers and cannot 
be Implemented tn a recession. 
The following proposals are for actions tn the medium-term to Improve the employment 
prospects for the next generation of older workers. 
4.1  At European level 
t) European Social Fund atd for targeted tratntng of older employees 
The European Social Fund should specifically subsidise employer tratntng of workers 
over 40 tn order to update skills or adapt to new technologies. 
4.2  At national level 
1) Financial Incentives for targeted training of older employees National governments 
should take complementary measures to promote and advise on employers' Investment 
tn specific training of workers over 40. 
tt) Statutory measures to oblige employers to assist older redundant workers 
An obltgation on employers to help re-train older workers made redundant, or to assist 
them tn seeking another job, would ensure employers considered the tmpltcattons of 
redundancy policies Involving older employees. 
ttl) Inclusion of the term 'older worker' tn national labour laws and constitutions 
Specific mention of older workers and age criteria tn all relevant labour laws would 
draw attention to the situation of older workers and provide a basts for measures tn 
their favour. 
Inclusion of 'age' tn non-dtscrtmlnation clauses tn national constitutions would provide 
vttallegal protection. 
tv) Promotion of flexible working time and flexible retirement Flexlblltty throughout the 
working ltfe, as well as around retirement age, would allow greater choice for tndlvldu-
als, provided financial tmpllcattons were neutral. It could also allow retirement to be 
based on the length of the working career, rather than chronological age. Governments 
need to take specific actions to promote these options with employers and trade unions. 
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Annex 1 
Additional tables 
Table 1:  General legal retirement age for salaried employees, 1991 
B  DK  D  GRa)  E  F  IRL  lb)  L 
Men  60  67  65  65  65  60  65  60/65  65 
Women  60  67  65  60  65  60  65  55/60  65 
a) In Greece, the retirement age has been standardised at 65 for men and women for 
all workers entering the insurance system after January 1993. 
b) In Italy, the offiCial retirement ages will be 65 for men and 60 for women from 1994. 
Table 2: Activity rates by age groups in Eur 12 in percentages 
ALL  Males  Females 
50-54  69.1  89.0  49.4 
55-59  53.4  72.4  353 
60-64  25.1  37.0  14.4 
65-69  7.6  11.3  4.6 
those in work or actively seeking work as a percentage of total population 
Source Eurostat 1992 
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